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A Serendipitous Experiment in Percolation of Intellectual 
Property Doctrine 
DANIEL R. CAHOY* AND LYNDA J. OSWALD** 
What do we sacrifice when we put our faith in a specialized patent court? This article 
breaks new ground by identifying and investigating a serendipitous natural 
experiment in the development of intellectual property doctrine under a specialized 
versus a percolating court system that allows us to address the trade-offs inherent in 
court structures. 
Since 1982, all patent-related appeals from district courts and the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office have been channeled to a single, specialized appellate court: 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Only the U.S. Supreme Court has 
more say on patent issues, and its intervention is necessarily rare. The Federal 
Circuit was established to eliminate the inconsistency that develops when multiple 
appellate courts weigh in on an issue, as is the norm in most other areas of the law. 
Notwithstanding the importance of doctrinal uniformity, scholars have pointed out 
that multi-court “percolation” of issues has important advantages as well, such as 
reducing judicial hyperactivity and activism. However, if U.S. patent law suffers 
from the lack of percolation, there have not been concrete examples to date; there 
has been only theory and speculation on this point. 
A key predicate to our investigation is the fact that the patent and trademark 
statutes have identical language related to fee shifting, but only the latter currently 
percolates. Leveraging these contrasting jurisprudential states, our article assesses 
six decades of patent and trademark case law to understand the impact of these two 
conditions on doctrinal formation. The empirical evidence uncovered is powerful 
and provides a novel understanding of a fundamental problem in common law legal 
theory and policy. Significantly, we find that percolation does indeed have clear 
advantages—it is more likely to result in doctrine that preserves the function of the 
trial court and avoids inappropriate policy making. We track how Federal Circuit 
doctrine moved further and further from that formed through percolation among the 
regional circuits until the Supreme Court’s 2014 fee-shifting decisions reined in the 
Federal Circuit and forced its interpretation of the statutory language back toward 
the path pursued by the generalist circuit courts in the trademark area. The empirical 
evidence thus provides powerful evidence that, regardless of the importance of 
uniformity, there is a trade-off for investing a specialized court with the sole power 
of statutory interpretation. 
 
In the United States, patent doctrine is unique in that its development is dominated 
by a single, specialized appellate court.1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
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 1. “Specialized” is generally used to describe a court whose jurisdiction is demarcated 
by the subject matter of the cases it hears, as opposed to geography or to being a generalist 
court. See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526–
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Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) hears all patent appeals from federal district courts, as 
well as appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on issues of 
patentability. It is the practical end point for most patent issues, save the few that are 
granted an audience before the U.S. Supreme Court. This structure is unparalleled in 
the U.S. courts and stands out globally as an unusual component of a common law 
system.2  
The specialized nature of the Federal Circuit is no accident or anachronism. It was 
specifically designed in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 as a means for 
increasing the uniformity and predictability of patent doctrine.3 Prior to the creation 
of the Federal Circuit, policy makers and the business community complained that 
variability in patent law across the twelve regional federal appellate circuits led to an 
uncertain environment for patent protection.4 They feared this uncertainty could 
harm the innovation incentive that is a core rationale for patent rights.5 Congress 
intended to remedy the uncertainty by funneling all patent appeals into one 
specialized circuit court, thereby fostering the development of a true national patent 
jurisprudence.6 Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has been the primary voice on most 
issues of patent law. 
                                                                                                                 
 
27 (2008); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in 
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking 
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1445–46 (2012). 
 2. The Federal Circuit is currently the only Article III specialized appellate court in the 
federal court system. LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 14–15 tbl. 1.2 (2011). 
 3. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 
37–39 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012)). Congress’s primary stated goals in establishing 
the Federal Circuit as a specialized appellate court were “increas[ing] doctrinal stability in the 
field of patent law” and “fill[ing] a void in the judicial system by creating an appellate forum 
capable of exercising nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law [including patent 
law] where Congress determines there is a special need for nationwide uniformity.” S. REP. 
NO. 97-275, at 2, 5 (1981). 
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (1981); see also FRANK P. CIHLAR, THE COURT AMERICAN 
BUSINESS WANTED AND GOT: THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT iii (1982) (noting that the reform legislation attracted support from an unusually 
diverse set of constituencies). The Eleventh Circuit was formed on October 1, 1981, pursuant 
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 
1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 41 note (2012) (Amendments)). Prior to that, there 
were eleven regional circuits (the First through the Tenth and the D.C. Circuit). See id. 
 5. E.g., Industrial Innovation and Patent and Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings on 
H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 574–75 
(1980) (statement of Sidney A. Diamond, Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks); see also 
COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL 
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 152 (1975). The commonly-articulated 
potential benefits of specialized jurisdiction are (1) efficiency; (2) accuracy; and (3) uniformity 
of doctrine, Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1447–48, while the potential detriments are (1) 
potential bias or lack of independent judicial decision making; (2) less qualified judges; and 
(3) “tunnel vision.” Id. at 1449–50. See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Improving Federal Circuit 
Doctrine Through Increased Cross-Pollination, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 250–60 (2017) 
(summarizing commentators’ arguments on the pros and cons of court specialization). 
 6. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 16–27 (1981) (discussing the purpose, background, and 
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However, cracks have begun to appear in the Federal Circuit’s facade as the 
definitive and most accurate source of patent rules.7 Frequently, decisions of the 
court are criticized for their idiosyncratic and formalistic departures from established 
legal doctrine in other fields.8 In addition, the court has experienced an increase in 
scrutiny from the Supreme Court. In the first half of the Federal Circuit’s existence, 
the Supreme Court rarely granted certiorari to patent issues, but now it is a 
substantially more common occurrence.9 The Federal Circuit seems more plainly 
fallible and in need of correction than initially perceived at its outset. 
Some argue that the source of the problem is the specialized nature of the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction, which causes all patent appeals to be channeled to a single 
appellate court.10 In contrast, issues arising in other areas of intellectual property law 
such as copyrights and trademarks are appealed from district courts to one of the 
twelve generalist regional circuits.11 This geographic distribution enables multiple 
courts to rule on the same issue (albeit in different cases),12 theoretically permitting 
more doctrinal experimentation and the opportunity to reach a more informed 
consensus on the proper rule. This distributed decision-making is known as 
                                                                                                                 
 
need for the legislation). 
 7. See Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1442 (noting that scholars argue that “the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction leads to poor percolation of legal ideas, less experimentation 
with legal principles, and, ultimately, a patent law that, although uniform, is insular and 
severed from economic reality”). 
 8. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy & Lynda J. Oswald, Complexity and Idiosyncrasy at the 
Federal Circuit, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 216, 225–28 (2018); Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 123 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit 
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003); Peter Lee, 
Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 405 (2012); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 
(2010); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); David O. Taylor, Formalism and 
Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415 
(2013); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 794 (2003). 
“Classic formalism embraces the view that the law is a scientific system in which legal 
institutions use rules to dictate correct outcomes in all cases.” Taylor, supra, at 423–24. 
 9. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Essay, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1061, 1082-83 (2017) (noting the shift in the relationship between the Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court from the period of early circuit autonomy to current Federal Circuit 
acquiescence); cf. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 387 (2001) (noting that prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit, the 
Supreme Court was deeply involved in patent law jurisprudence but took on “benchwarmer” 
status after 1982). 
 10. For a summary of this debate, see Oswald, supra note 5, at 250–55. 
 11. The Judiciary Act of 1891 (commonly known as the Evarts Act) created the first nine 
courts of appeals and gave them jurisdiction over most appeals arising from the U.S district 
courts. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The D.C., Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits were added in 1893, 
1929, and 1980, respectively. The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. 
CTR., https:/www.fjc.gov/node/6766 [https://perma.cc/KK3D-JX3B].  
 12. See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he decisions of 
one circuit are not binding on other circuits.”). 
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“percolation.”13 That the Federal Circuit lacks percolation is well covered in the 
literature as a theoretical topic.14 However, to date, it has not been possible to 
definitively establish in the real world how a particular issue would be handled 
differently in isolation versus percolation. A particular doctrine either percolates or 
it does not, depending upon whether multiple courts or a single court has jurisdiction 
to hear the issue. 
This Article fills a gap in the literature by providing novel and unique empirical 
evidence of the impact of percolated intellectual property doctrine versus the impact 
of isolated doctrine from a specialized court. It relies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
paired decisions in 2014 in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.15 
and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.16 to highlight a 
natural forum for evaluating the effects of percolation on federal legal doctrine. At 
issue in those cases was the fee-shifting language of Section 285 of the Patent Act: 
“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.”17 Fortuitously, Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act, enacted twenty-two years 
after Section 285, contains the identical provision for the trademark and specific 
types of unfair competition cases that arise under it.18 Moreover, while patent appeals 
are now heard exclusively by the Federal Circuit, appeals from Lanham Act cases go 
to the regional circuits.19 The treatment of Lanham Act fee shifting in comparison to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. See Oswald, supra note 5, at 255–60 (discussing role of percolation in the federal 
court system). 
 14. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Bock, Restructuring the Federal Circuit, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. 
PROP. & ENT. L. 197 (2014); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent 
Adjudication: The Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505 (2013); Samuel 
Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s Responsibilities: 
An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as 
“Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 657 (2009); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 350 (2014); Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution 
Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471 (1983); Craig Allen Nard 
& John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 
(2007); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay 
on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983); 
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1111 (1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 
67 (1995); Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in 
Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523 (2004). 
 15. 572 U.S. 545 (2014). 
 16. 572 U.S. 559 (2014). While separate actions, these two cases were argued before the 
Court on the same day (February 26, 2014) and decided on the same day (April 29, 2014).  
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).  
 19. By statute, all cases arising under the Patent Act are appealed exclusively to the 
Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). The Federal Circuit also hears trademark cases 
arising from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board, addressing issues such as registration, cancellation, and renewal. 28 U.S.C. § 
1295(a)(4) (2012). The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over an eclectic collection 
of other subject matters as well, including international trade, government contracts, federal 
personnel, and veterans’ benefits. Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., 
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Patent Act fee shifting is thus a serendipitous natural experiment that allows a 
comparison of two forms of doctrinal development. 
Using this experimental lens, we engage in a detailed analysis of fee-shifting cases 
and compare the results under percolation and specialization. Based on the literature, 
our hypothesis is that percolation is likely to produce doctrine that, while 
nonuniform, actually adheres more closely to statutory intent. We expect that the 
percolation blunts the type of judicial hyperactivity20 and activism that mars the 
decision-making of a specialized court like the Federal Circuit. And indeed, our 
results bear this out. They demonstrate, for the first time, that lack of percolation led 
to weaker doctrine in the Federal Circuit than in the regional circuits, despite 
identical statutory language. 
Part I of this Article puts the experiment in context by explaining the role of 
generalist versus specialized courts in developing legal doctrine and the clear trade-
off between uniformity of doctrine and the advantages of percolation. It provides the 
theoretical construct that is so in need of empirical validation. Part II begins the 
empirical study by considering over six decades of Patent Act fee-shifting case law, 
beginning with the first enactment of a statutory provision in 1946. It describes how, 
when patent fee-shifting doctrine percolated through the regional circuits from 1946 
to 1982, it was relatively stable, and outcomes were noncontroversial and largely 
congruent with the Supreme Court’s rulings in Octane Fitness and Highmark half a 
century later. However, with the 1982 introduction of the Federal Circuit as the sole 
voice in intermediate patent appeals, percolation ceased. Patent fee-shifting doctrine 
started to harden along rigid and inappropriate lines, eventually taking on the 
formalistic, inflexible format that was ultimately struck down by the Court in 2014. 
In Part III, the paper presents the contrasting case of Lanham Act fee-shifting case 
law. The Lanham Act fee-shifting provision was adopted in 1974 and has always 
percolated through the regional circuit courts. Doctrine developed under the Lanham 
Act provision is less uniform than that found in patent law, as one would expect from 
percolating doctrine. However, we demonstrate that the Lanham Act fee-shifting 
doctrine was more consistent with the Supreme Court’s eventual edicts in Octane 
Fitness and Highmark than was the nonpercolating doctrine of the specialized 
Federal Circuit. Part IV concludes that percolation does indeed have clear 
advantages; it is more likely to result in doctrine that preserves the function of the 
trial court and avoids inappropriate policy making, although at the cost of uniformity 
                                                                                                                 
 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/GUW7-H9LL]. 
However, the court’s caseload is increasingly being dominated by patent appeals. In fiscal year 
2018, for example, two-thirds of the Federal Circuit’s caseload consisted of patent appeals 
originating in either the district courts or the USPTO. Appeals Filed, by Category, FY 2018, 
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the 
-court/statistics/CaseloadbyCategory2018_-_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W57-CUVC]. Most 
other cases arising from the federal district courts, including trademark infringement cases 
under the Lanham Act, are appealed to the relevant regional circuit court. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 (2012).  
 20. See, e.g., William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The 
Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 735–39 
(2000) (describing the Federal Circuit’s hyperactivity in considering arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal).  
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in doctrine. Trade-offs indeed must be made when choosing court structures. We 
discuss our findings and suggest lessons to be learned that may lead to improvements 
and more informed analysis of the Federal Circuit.  
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN PERCOLATION 
The Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction is intentionally designed to diverge 
from the standard way that legal questions move through the federal court system. 
Before addressing this unique structure, it is useful to consider how doctrine 
normally develops under the multi-circuit scheme of the U.S. courts. The theoretical 
structural advantages and disadvantages of the Federal Circuit then become clearer 
in contrast. With that contrast in mind, one appreciates the power of identifying, for 
comparison and contrast, a specific legal rule that has been developed under both 
conditions, in serial and parallel time periods.  
A. Percolation Versus Specialization 
When a decision from one of the United States’ ninety-four judicial districts is 
appealed, it is assigned to the appropriate regional circuit court.21 Because those 
circuits are separate equals, they can hear the same issue and determine their own 
resolution, unless and until the Supreme Court renders a nationwide rule. The way 
that doctrinal issues bubble up somewhat unpredictably from circuit to circuit is 
appropriately described as “percolation.” 
Simply put, percolation arises when multiple courts consider and develop the law 
simultaneously in multiple settings.22 It occurs automatically in the bulk of the 
federal system. The distributed nature of intermediate appellate jurisdiction enables 
the issues these courts hear to be fully explored and developed through successive or 
contemporaneous court opinions, which may or may not be congruent. As discussed 
by Professors Estreicher and Sexton, this exploration can lead to deeper analysis and 
more innovative doctrine as a result of coequal courts considering each other’s 
decisions,23 may allow the regional circuits to work their way to consistent doctrine 
without Supreme Court involvement,24 and encourages experimentation with 
different doctrines that can more fully inform future Supreme Court action if circuit 
conflicts do not resolve on their own.25 In short, the percolation that arises 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. The geographic boundaries of the regional circuits are shown at Geographic 
Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S. 
CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B34H-CBNC].  
 22. See Oswald, supra note 5, at 255–60.  
 23. Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 14, at 699 n.68; See also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN 
SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 47 (1986); MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE 
COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 57 (1999); Charles L. Black, Jr., The 
National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE L J. 883, 898 (1974); Revesz, supra 
note 14, at 1114.  
 24. Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 14, at 699 n.68. 
 25. Id.  
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automatically in a federal court system having multiple, coequal appellate courts 
helps ensure that alternatives are thoroughly analyzed and considered before doctrine 
is settled.  
The downside of percolation, of course, is the potential for at least short-term lack 
of uniformity in doctrine. Because each regional circuit court sets its own 
precedents,26 percolation can result in a period of disuniformity in federal doctrine 
(i.e., circuit splits) where federal doctrine (which theoretically should be uniform) 
diverges among the circuits.27 Circuit splits can result in some obvious detriments, 
including uncertainty in the law, disparate outcomes for similarly situated parties, 
and incentives for forum shopping.28 Nonetheless, a certain level of disuniformity is 
not only tolerated but embraced within the federal legal system because of the 
advantages that arise from having multiple courts address issues in a variety of 
manners.29 As Estreicher and Sexton explained: “It may be that such disuniformity 
was an unintended byproduct of a geographically dispersed, decentralized judicial 
structure; but it is a feature that has endured . . . because the system’s commitment 
to uniformity is qualified by a policy in favor of intercircuit experimentation.”30 In a 
sense, circuit splits are the price we pay to obtain the benefits of doctrinal percolation.  
Some commentators view this as a worthwhile trade-off. For example, Professor 
Dreyfuss argued that “in a country as complex as the United States, the adjudicatory 
system is stronger when courts have overlapping jurisdiction and the independence 
to question one another, modify each other’s outcomes, and resolve similar issues 
differently.”31 She concluded that “the Supreme Court benefits from—and depends 
upon—this activity; and that percolation provides important information to 
Congress.”32 Similarly, Professors Nard and Duffy argued that circuit splits 
contribute to better lawyering, better and more comprehensive presentation of 
information by the litigants, and hence, better judicial decision-making.33 
However, some commentators argue that the disuniformity produced by 
percolation offsets any advantages that might arise from having multiple courts 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Each circuit’s precedents then become binding on all district courts within its circuit 
(but not upon any outside its circuit). See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 
(11th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted); WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND 
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 173–74 (4th ed. 2006). 
 27. See generally Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008) 
(discussing the role of circuit splits in the federal legal system). 
 28. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the 
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1449 (2009). 
 29. E.g., John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 
183 (1982); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the Supreme Court: 
A Comment on Justice Rehnquist's Proposal, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 15, 22 (1986) (discussing 
Justice William Rehnquist’s approval of percolation prior to a grant of certiorari that he 
articulated in United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984)). 
 30. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 23, at 48 (citation omitted), quoted in Nard & 
Duffy, supra note 14, at 1651 n.111; See also Oswald, supra note 5, at 255 n.37 (citing sources 
arguing that circuit splits are often inconsequential or even promote sound doctrinal 
development). 
 31. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 523. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Nard & Duffy, supra note 14, at 1633. 
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analyzing and creating doctrine. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, found 
this aspect of percolation troubling: “[T]hat it is actually desirable to allow important 
questions of federal law to ‘percolate’ in the lower courts for a few years before the 
Supreme Court takes them on seems to me a very strange suggestion; at best it is 
making a virtue of necessity.”34 Professor Meador, a key architect of the Federal 
Circuit, dismissed percolation in the statutory interpretation setting as “a euphemism 
for incoherence.”35 Similarly, Professor Bator declared that “percolation is not a 
purposeful project. It is just a way of postponing decision . . . .”36 However, unless 
the Supreme Court steps in or Congress avails itself of the opportunity to pass 
clarifying legislation to resolve a circuit split, the conflict in federal law will persist 
unless the regional circuits work their way toward consensus on their own through 
successive panel or en banc decisions.37 
The use of a specialized appellate court is a choice against percolation. It greatly 
reduces the potential for disuniformity and eliminates the risk of circuit splits, but at 
the cost of short circuiting the percolation effect of diverse intermediate appellate 
courts.38 Without peer courts issuing opinions in the same area, some scholars fear, 
the specialized court may not be motivated to generate detailed or persuasive 
opinions, and may fall back on arcane or dense vocabulary, complex, overly refined 
rule systems, or excessive formalism.39 Lack of percolation thus may lead to 
suboptimal doctrine.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1986). 
 35. Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional 
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 634 (1989). 
 36. Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 690 
(1990); see also id. at 689 (arguing that “perpetuating uncertainty and instability during a 
process of percolation exacts important and painful costs” upon litigants); Erwin N. Griswold, 
The Federal Courts Today and Tomorrow: A Summary and Survey, 38 S.C. L. REV. 393, 406 
(1987) (arguing that law based upon percolating doctrine rather than a clear binding precedent 
is “difficult to ascertain, unpredictable, and highly dependent on the outlook of a particular 
judge who considers the case”).  
 37. The Supreme Court Rules list an intercircuit split on an “important matter” as one of 
several factors to be considered in determining whether the Court should grant a petition for 
writ of certiorari. SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari”). 
However, the Supreme Court grants certiorari in fewer than one-half of the circuit splits 
presented to it each year. See Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court 
Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 193 
tbl.2 (2001) (detailing data from the 1986 through 1999 Supreme Court terms); George & 
Guthrie, supra note 28, at 1449. Lack of Supreme Court action does not necessarily mean that 
the circuit split will persist, however. As Justice Ginsburg noted: “There is, of course, an ideal 
intercircuit conflict resolver. . . . Congress itself. On the correct interpretation of federal 
statutes, no assemblage is better equipped to say which circuit got it right.” See A Bill to 
Establish an Intercircuit Panel, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 704 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 115 (1985) (statement of 
J. Ruth Bader Ginsburg) (Justice Ginsburg was a judge on the D.C. Circuit at the time). 
 38. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to 
Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 828–29 (2010). 
 39. See, e.g., David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 848 
(1999); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 
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In addition to shortfalls in doctrinal formation, a lack of percolation may foster 
problematic tendencies in overall judicial decision-making. Of particular concern is 
“hyperactivity.” As Professors Rooklidge and Weil articulated the concept, 
hyperactivity is an appellate court’s improper intrusion into the established role of 
the trial court.40 Specialized courts are more likely to succumb to the temptation to 
intrude due to their mandate of uniformity and belief in their own expertise.41 In 
contrast, percolating generalist courts are less inclined toward hyperactivity due to 
the sheer burden of their caseloads. The variety of cases they hear make the 
production of complex and detailed enhancements of doctrine more difficult and less 
desirable.42 A percolating court will tend to restrain itself to its proper role. 
Another concern is that specialization may lead to judicial activism. Judicial 
activism (at least by some definitions) is the tendency of a court to craft law in 
furtherance of certain ideology or make policy instead of reserving such power to the 
political branches.43 A more isolated court can fall prey to the temptation to place 
itself above policymakers due to its confidence in its superior expertise.44 Such 
activism is less likely in the case of a percolating court because of the diversity of 
cases it hears.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989); Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1440–41 (citing PAUL D. 
CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 168 (1976)); 
Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 
37 A.B.A. J. 425, 426 (1951); Thomas, supra note 8, at 796–808. 
 40. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 20, at 726.  
 41. See Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical 
Study, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 775 (2012) (noting that the average number of cases pending 
per judge for the regional circuits in 2008 was 426.7, but was only 78.9 for the Federal Circuit, 
and suggesting that this may be a reason for the Federal Circuit’s hyperactivity); Arti K. Rai, 
Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 883 
(2002) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has asserted power over fact. . . . [B]y simply declaring claim 
construction to be a pure question of law subject to de novo review.”). 
 42. Cf. Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 589 (2003) (suggesting that hyperactivity in the Federal 
Circuit may be the result of its large patent caseload and perceived mandate to clarify patent 
law). 
 43. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) 
(defining judicial activism as “an illegitimate intrusion by the courts into the realm properly 
reserved to the political branches of government”). 
 44. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 
AM. U. L. REV. 683, 688 (1993). Judge Newman described how activism could specifically 
impact the Federal Circuit: 
The Federal Circuit has been shielded, by its diverse jurisdiction and the breadth 
of experience of its judges, from the pitfalls of a “specialized” court wherein a 
cadre of experts, secure in its superior knowledge of the policy that the law 
should serve, comes to view itself as judge, advocate, and jury. Caution is needed 
lest our increasing maturity expose us to this pitfall. It is policy choices that lead 
to departure from precedent, into the judicial activism that weighs against legal 
stability. Although all judicial decisions reflect, to some degree, the judge's 
personal predilections, policy choices are not the province of judges.  
Id. 
 45. See id. 
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At the time of the Federal Circuit’s creation in 1982, Congress’s primary stated 
goals were to “increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law”46 and to “fill a 
void in the judicial system by creating an appellate forum capable of exercising 
nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law [including patent law] where 
Congress determines there is a special need for nationwide uniformity.”47 Congress 
expressly recognized that some of the regional circuits were seen as “‘pro-patent’ 
and other [sic] ‘anti-patent’” and found that the divergent approaches to patent law 
among the regional circuits were counterproductive and expensive.48 By contrast, the 
creation of a single appellate court for patents would provide a mechanism for 
ensuring that patent rights would be “more stable and predictable.”49 In short, in 
creating the Federal Circuit, Congress made a conscious decision to reject the 
benefits of percolation in order to advance the benefits of court specialization—
particularly, the fostering of uniformity of patent law.  
But given the advantages of percolation and pitfalls of specialization, what impact 
has the trade-off chosen by Congress had upon the development of patent doctrine? 
That historically has been a difficult question to answer empirically. Scholars have 
examined the role of percolation in the specialized court setting, but these analyses 
have been largely theoretical.50 However, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court 
in Octane Fitness and Highmark, coupled with the fortuitous happenstance of 
identical fee-shifting provisions in the Patent and Lanham Acts, provide a rare and 
remarkable ready-made experiment for evaluating the role that percolation plays in 
shaping accurate federal doctrine. 
B. Two Observable Settings for Intellectual Property Doctrinal Development 
Parallel sections of the Patent and Lanham Acts use identical language in granting 
the district courts discretion in awarding attorney fees: “The court in exceptional 
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”51 Patent appeals, 
of course, fall under the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit; Lanham Act 
appeals, by contrast, are heard by the regional circuits.52 As a result, the fee-shifting 
language of these two acts provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the effects of 
percolation by examining doctrinal development of identical statutory provisions in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981). 
 47. Id. at 2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 16–27 (1981) (discussing the purpose, 
background, and need for H.R. 4482, 97th Cong. (1981) (enacted), which established the 
Federal Circuit).   
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–21. 
 49. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6. 
 50. See supra note 14. Commentators have lamented the difficulty of constructing an 
instrument that would allow accurate measurement of the Federal Circuit’s overall success or 
failure as a specialized court in meaningful, significant empirical terms. See, e.g., Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 769, 772 (2004); Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 850–54 (2012). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 52. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (explaining the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit in patent and trademark cases).  
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two settings: one arising in a specialized court context with no percolation and one 
in a generalist court context with significant percolation. 
Litigation procedure in the United States generally follows the “American Rule,” 
under which, in the absence of a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary,                                                                  
each litigant pays his or her own attorney fees, regardless of success or failure in the 
litigation.53 The American Rule was recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 
1796.54  It stands in stark contrast to the “English Rule,” under which the losing party 
is responsible for the attorney fees of its opponent as well as its own.55 A 1974 Senate 
report discussed the historical context of the American Rule and its development in 
the early years of the country’s development, noting that in a system in which few 
litigants hired attorneys, the issue of fee awards rarely arose.56 When it did arise, 
courts were fearful that allowing such awards would restrict access to the courts, 
discourage litigants from bringing suits in which outcomes were not certain, 
encourage excessive attorney fees, and pose difficulties for courts in calculating 
appropriate fees.57 
Despite over two hundred statutes today authorizing awards of attorney fees in 
specific types of cases,58 fee shifting is still considered an exception to the general 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010) (“‘Our basic 
point of reference’ when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle 
known as the ‘“American Rule”’: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, 
unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” (citations omitted)). See generally Alyeska 
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247–63 (1975) (providing history of 
the American Rule); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984); Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys’ Fees for 
Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. REV. 613, 613–14 (1983); Kenneth W. Starr, The 
Shifting Panorama of Attorneys' Fees Awards: The Expansion of Fee Recoveries in Federal 
Court, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 189 (1986); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee 
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570–90 (1993).  
 54. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (per curiam) (“The 
general practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to [fee shifting]; and even if that 
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is 
changed, or modified, by statute.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 55. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 46–47 (1984); Jacob Singer, Note, Bad Faith Fee-Shifting in Federal 
Courts: What Conduct Qualifies?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 693, 695 (2010). 
 56. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 4–5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7133 
(prepared in conjunction with the statutory amendment allowing recovery of attorney fees in 
the trademark context). 
 57. Id. As summarized by the Supreme Court, the American Rule promotes broad access 
to the courts by not penalizing a party “for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit.” 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also 
Richard J. Leighton, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in “Exceptional” Lanham Act Cases: A 
“Jumble” of “Murky” Law, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 849, 852 (2012) (explaining the theory 
behind the American Rule). 
 58. Vargo, supra note 53, at 1588; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, 
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 716 (Concise 5th ed. 2019); Peter N. 
Cubita, Jeffrey S. Lichtman & Daniel D. Rubino, Note, Award of Attorney’s Fees in the 
Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 286–89 (1982). 
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norm of the American Rule.59 A court’s departure from the American Rule is thus an 
event of particular note in a litigation. Because the Patent and Lanham Acts happen 
to have identical fee-shifting language, it is possible to review the resulting cases and 
draw direct comparisons as to how the doctrine regarding the application of this 
legislative language has developed in the two fields.  
 II. PERCOLATION AND STATUTORY FEE SHIFTING UNDER THE PATENT ACT 
The history of recovery of attorney fees in patent litigation is one of frequently 
morphing parameters, as not only did the statutory provisions for fee shifting change 
over time, but patent appeals relocated from the percolation-rich environment of the 
regional circuits to the more isolated setting of the Federal Circuit in 1982. Moving 
from a nonshifting regime to a more flexible system as a result of statutory revision, 
and then to a rigid and narrow standard through the actions of a specialized court, the 
environment for litigants changed substantially over a period of nearly 100 years. As 
a result, there is a solid basis for experimental comparison. In fact, as this Part 
demonstrates, the patent arena even by itself provides a rich environment for 
examining the effects of percolation on doctrinal development. 
A. Fee Shifting under the 1946 Patent Act 
For the first one and one-half centuries of U.S patent law, the American Rule 
prevailed in patent litigation.60 Attorney fees were not considered a proper element 
of damage or remedies, and each side bore its own costs of counsel in patent 
litigation.61 Then, in 1946, Congress amended the patent statutes, giving the district 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. Statutory provisions authorizing fee shifting can be found in all areas of federal 
intellectual property law today. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (addressing fee shifting in 
trademark actions); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (addressing fee shifting in copyright actions); 18 
U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D) (Supp. 2019) (addressing fee-shifting in civil trade secret 
misappropriation actions); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (addressing fee shifting in patent actions). The 
Copyright Act was the first federal intellectual property statute to provide for fee shifting, in 
1909; its language is broad and, unlike the Patent and Lanham Acts, does not limit recovery 
to particularly egregious cases. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 40, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012)) (“That in all actions, suits, or proceedings under 
this Act, except when brought by or against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs 
shall be allowed, and the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee 
as part of the costs.”). 
 60. There were rare exceptions where the courts used their common law powers to 
provide for attorney fees in patent cases in unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Parker Rust Proof 
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 F.2d 502, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1928) (awarding attorney fees to 
compensate patent owner for unnecessary expenses incurred as a result of defendant’s 
behavior); Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957, 958 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (“[T]he jury are 
at liberty, if they see fit, to allow the plaintiff as part of his ‘actual damage,’ any expenditure 
for counsel fees . . . which were necessarily incurred to vindicate the rights derived under his 
patent, and are not taxable in the bill of costs.”). 
 61. For example, in Teese v. Huntingdon, the Supreme Court stated that “[c]ounsel fees 
are not a proper element for the consideration of the jury in the estimation of damages in 
actions for the infringement of a patent right.” 64 U.S (23 How.) 2, 8–9 (1859); see also Philp 
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courts discretionary authority to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.62 Specifically, Section 70 provided: “The court may in its discretion award 
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any 
patent case.”63 
In 1975, Ahart published a comprehensive overview of the history of attorney fee 
recovery in patent cases.64 As he explained, the 1946 fee-shifting language was 
introduced initially in H.R. 5231, which provided that a prevailing patent owner, 
upon showing patent infringement, should be able to recover costs and “expenses.”65 
The Assistant Commissioner of Patents argued that the term “expenses” was overly 
broad and unusual in the statutory context and suggested that the term “reasonable 
attorneys fees to be fixed by the court” be adopted instead.66 The Commissioner of 
Patents supported this proposed language change,67 and H.R. 5231 was reported out 
of the House Committee with this amendment regarding attorney fees included.68 
Ahart identified this as the first apparent mention of fee shifting in the U.S. patent 
statutes.69 
H.R. 5311 then replaced H.R. 5231.70 According to Ahart, the primary purpose of 
H.R. 5311 was to switch recovery in patent infringement suits from profits and 
damages (which required an often lengthy and expensive showing of actual profits) 
to the more easily shown general damages instead.71 The provision for recovery of 
attorney fees was simply a small part of this larger reform package. As introduced, 
H.R. 5311 adopted H.R 5231’s language that a patent owner could recover 
“reasonable” attorney fees.72 The Senate Committee on Patents, however, broadened 
the fee-shifting language considerably by providing that any prevailing party, 
whether the patent owner or not, could recover reasonable attorney fees, but only at 
                                                                                                                 
 
v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460, 462 (1873) (“Counsel fees cannot be included in the [patent 
infringement] verdict.”). 
 62. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946)) 
(amended 1952) (amending section 4921 of the Revised Statutes). 
 63. 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (amended 1952). 
 64. Alan M. Ahart, Attorneys’ Fees: The Patent Experience, 57 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 608 
(1975). Ahart was an LLM student at the time; he went on to become a bankruptcy judge for 
the Central District of California in 1988. 
 65. Id. at 615 (citation omitted). The language of H,R 5231 was quoted in the committee 
hearing on H.R. 5231 (Reported as H.R. 5311). Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: 
Hearing on H.R. 5231 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong. (1946) [hereinafter 
Hearings]. 
 66. Id. (citation omitted). The comments of the Assistant Commissioner of Patents can be 
found at Hearings, supra note 65, at 10 (statement of Conder C. Henry, Assistant 
Commissioner of Patents). 
 67. Hearings, supra note 65, at 14 (statement of Casper W. Ooms, Commissioner of 
Patents). 
 68. Id. at 616 (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. at 615. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 79-1587, at 1). 
 72. Id. at 616. 
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the discretion of the trial court (which had authority not only to set the amount but 
also to decline to award any recovery of fees).73  
The Senate’s version was enacted in Section 70 of the Patent Act in 1946.74 The 
legislative history made clear congressional expectation that recovery of attorney 
fees was to be regarded as an uncommon remedy for extreme situations and was not 
to become the norm in patent cases.75 Giving the trial court discretion to award 
attorney fees in addition to its existing discretion to award treble damages was 
believed to “discourage infringement of a patent by anyone thinking that all he would 
be required to pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty.”76 In addition, the language 
was “made general” so that the trial court would be able “to prevent a gross injustice 
to an alleged infringer.”77 
In 1946, of course, the Federal Circuit was decades away from being formed. The 
regional circuit courts still had jurisdiction over patent appeals, and thus by 
definition, the new fee-shifting language percolated among the eleven circuit courts 
then in existence.78 Section 70 had just a brief six-year life span, however, before 
being replaced by Section 285 in 1952.79 There were few published appellate cases 
addressing the recovery of attorney fees under Section 70—fewer than thirty80—
reflecting both the provision’s short life and the relatively small number of patent 
cases filed during that time period.81  
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1503 (1946); 92 CONG. REC. 9188 (1946) (statement of Sen. 
Pepper)). 
 74. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 Stat. 778 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946)) 
(amended 1952). 
 75. S. REP. NO. 79-1503, at 2 (1946). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. In 1946, the First through the Tenth Circuits and the D.C. Circuit were in place. 
Today, following the creation of the Eleventh Circuit in 1980 and the Federal Circuit in 1982, 
there are thirteen circuit courts. See The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Federal Judiciary, 
supra note 11. 
 79. See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 
101–376).  
 80. A LexisAdvance search conducted on Jan. 16, 2019, revealed 30 appellate decisions 
between 1946 and 1952. The search terms were “35 usc 70 and attorney! fee!”, the search was 
limited to courts of appeals decisions, and the date parameters were January 1, 1946, to 
December 31, 1955. (The end date was extended past the repeal date of Section 70 to pick up 
cases in progress but not yet decided at the time of amendment.)  
 81. For fiscal year (FY) 1941 (ending June 30, 1941), 953 patent cases were filed in the 
district courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 56 (1946). The number of patent 
cases filed in the trial courts declined significantly during the war years. See id. (noting that 
543 patent cases were filed before the district courts in FY 1942; 318 in FY 1943; 225 in FY 
1944; and 226 in FY 1945). Although the number of cases rose between 1946 and 1952, the 
numbers remained significantly below the FY 1941 patent-case filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS 85 (1950); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 87 (1952) 
(noting that 299 patent cases were filed before the district courts in FY 1946; 370 in FY 1947; 
476 in FY 1948; 560 in FY 1949; 689 in FY 1950; 589 in FY 1951; and 519 in FY 1952). The 
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Section 70 was apparently uncontroversial at the time of its adoption and during 
its fleeting enactment. The handful of appellate cases addressing Section 70 looked 
for evidence of “unfairness or bad faith,”82 “vexatious and unjustified litigation,”83 
or other “equitable considerations”84 that would justify fee shifting. They cautioned 
that fee shifting was not to be applied as “a matter of course” but rather only where 
it was necessary “to prevent a gross injustice.”85 The trial court was required to 
clearly state the grounds for making such an award,86 but decisions rested solely 
within the discretion of the trial court.87  
“Bad faith” and “gross injustice” quickly emerged as key concepts in delineating 
judicial application of Section 70. For example, in a leading decision issued five 
years after Section 70’s enactment, Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, the Ninth 
Circuit reviewed the legislative history and decisions by trial and appellate courts 
and summarized the state of the law thus:  
The exercise of discretion in favor of such an allowance should be 
bottomed upon a finding of unfairness or bad faith in the conduct of the 
losing party, or some other equitable consideration of similar force, 
which makes it grossly unjust that the winner of the particular law suit 
be left to bear the burden of his own counsel fees . . . .88 
                                                                                                                 
 
number of appeals taken from the cases filed would be significantly lower, of course, and the 
number of appeals raising fee-shifting issues lower yet. 
 82. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Ruby Lighting Corp., 191 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1951); see 
also Turchan v. Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co., 208 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1953); Faulkner v. 
Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 642 (9th Cir. 1952). 
 83. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D. Md.), aff’d, 
185 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1950) (adopting trial court’s opinion “as an expression of [its own] 
views”); Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Rochester Ropes, 199 F.2d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1952) (citing 
Phillips Petroleum, 91 F. Supp. 215, aff’d, 185 F.2d 672).  
 84. Faulkner, 199 F.2d at 642. 
 85. Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d 445, 450–51 (3d Cir. 
1951). See also Blanc v. Spartan Tool Co., 178 F.2d 104, 105 (7th Cir. 1949) (attorney fees 
are “not to be allowed in the usual patent case”). 
 86. E.g., Faulkner, 199 F.2d at 642. 
 87. “Discretion” itself was a well-understood and noncontroversial concept. In the words 
of the Seventh Circuit: 
Judicial discretion . . . is impartial reasoning, guided and controlled in its exercise 
by fixed legal principles, requiring the court, in consideration of the facts and 
circumstances, to decide as its reason and conscience dictate; it requires that the 
court be discreet, just, circumspect and impartial, and that it exercise cautious 
judgment. The term connotes the opposite of caprice and arbitrary action. 
Dixie Cup Co. v. Paper Container Mfg. Co., 174 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1949). 
 88. 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir. 1951) (citing cases). The Park-In-Theatres court set aside 
the trial court’s award of attorney fees, finding the suit had not been brought in “bad faith,” 
id., or on mere “surmise or suspicion,” id. at 143, and the litigants and lawyers had not engaged 
in “dilatory tactics,” id. The award was thus not necessary “to prevent a gross injustice.” Id. 
Park-In-Theatres was frequently cited by later courts applying 35 U.S.C. § 285, the successor 
provision to Section 70. See, e.g., Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 480 (8th 
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The appellate courts did overturn some attorney-fee awards where they found the 
trial court had abused its discretion, such as by failing to state the grounds for the 
award or by granting an award where the case presented “difficulties and 
uncertainties” sufficient to justify the litigation,89 but in general, application of 
Section 70 generated little apparent controversy. 
The analysis in most of the appellate opinions addressing Section 70 was fairly 
perfunctory. Published awards of attorney fees were relatively infrequent and 
involved overtly egregious circumstances, such as where the defendant willfully 
infringed the plaintiff’s patent,90 where the patent owner engaged in fraud on the 
USPTO in obtaining the patent at issue,91 or where the patent owner’s delay in suing 
detrimentally affected the defendant’s position such that it would have been 
inequitable for the court to enforce the patent.92 
A few trial courts attempted to flesh out the standard for awarding attorney fees. 
For example, one district court attempted to define the elusive concepts of “bad faith” 
and “good faith” by proving examples. A lawsuit “begun for some ulterior purpose 
with no intention of prosecuting it to the finish or with a certainty that it cannot 
succeed,” or “an infringement suit upon an expired patent or upon one invalidated 
by a judgment of the highest court or where the charge of infringement is plainly a 
sham” would be instances of bad faith.93 Merely filing an unsuccessful lawsuit is not, 
however, as that would render the action of every unsuccessful plaintiff suspect.94 
Another district court expanded on the definition of “inequitable conduct,” noting 
that it included acts such as “undue harassment, unnecessary prolongation of proofs, 
or the wrongful commencement of a wholly unfounded action brought for malicious 
purposes and not merely to determine the issues of validity and infringement.”95 
Another judge seemed to view the fee-shifting statute as an issue of broader public 
policy, stating: “I think it would be detrimental to the patent system to allow 
attorney’s fees, except in cases where the Court feels one party or another has been 
guilty of unfair or oppressive methods in pursuing the legal remedies allowed.”96 Yet 
another added an idiosyncratic gloss to fee shifting when it indicated that the relative 
wealth of the parties was a relevant consideration: “An award of attorney’s fees is 
                                                                                                                 
 
Cir. 1965); Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 475 n.11 (5th Cir. 1958); 
R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden’s, Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 89. See Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Rochester Ropes, 199 F.2d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1952). 
 90. Krieger v. Colby, 106 F. Supp. 124, 132 (S.D. Cal. 1952). 
 91. Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1950). 
 92. Brennan v. Hawley Prods. Co., 98 F. Supp. 369, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (noting that 
during plaintiff’s delay, defendant made extensive, expensive expansions to its manufacturing 
facilities, and two of its key witnesses died); see also Orrison v. C. Hoffberger Co., 190 F.2d 
787, 791 (4th Cir. 1951) (affirming trial court’s award of fees where trial court had determined 
that the patent owner’s motion for a new trial was “vexatious and unjustified” so as to 
unnecessarily extend litigation). 
 93. Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 108 F. Supp. 59, 70 (E.D. Pa. 
1952). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Vischer Prods. Co. v. Nat’l Pressure Cooker Co., 92 F. Supp. 138, 139 (W.D. Wis. 
1950). 
 96. Air Devices, Inc. v. Air Factors, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 819, 822 (S.D. Cal. 1951). 
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appropriate where the infringement complained of has been willful and the parties 
are disparate in resource.”97  
Generally, however, judicial application of the 1946 fee-shifting language was 
noncontroversial and relied upon the exercise of discretion by the trial courts, 
bounded by the above-stated flexible but seemingly well-understood standard of 
addressing “bad faith” behavior and preventing “gross injustice.” In part, this 
doctrinal stability could be explained by the relatively short life of Section 70, which 
provided scant time for doctrine to evolve along divergent lines in the various 
circuits, and in part because the legislative intent that recovery of attorney fees was 
to be an extraordinary event reserved for the most egregious cases was well-
recognized and well-accepted by trial and appellate courts alike. Courts set a high 
standard for fee awards, and recovery of attorney fees was indeed the extraordinary 
exception and not the norm during this time period. 
B. Fee Shifting Under the Patent Act of 1952 
In 1952, Congress enacted a wholesale revision of the patent law, the Patent Act 
of 1952.98 That revision introduced Section 285, the current fee-shifting language, 
which made two significant changes to the language of Section 70: (1) the qualifier 
“exceptional” was inserted to describe the type of cases in which fee shifting was 
appropriate, and (2) the words “in its discretion” were deleted. These changes can be 
seen through a direct comparison of the two provisions: 
Section 70: “The court may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s 
fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any patent 
case.”99 
 
Section 285: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”100  
Despite the alterations, Congress and the courts regarded these revisions to the 
fee-shifting language as nonsubstantive and as being made “for purposes of 
clarification” only.101 The Senate report, for example, indicated that the new 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Co., 99 F. Supp. 803, 808 (D. Del. 1951). Although 
the court did not expand on the relevance of the parties’ wealth to the recovery of fees, one 
can surmise that this falls under the category of “other equitable considerations.” It does not 
appear that other courts adopted this same criterion. 
 98. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–
376). 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (amended 1952).  
 100. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). 
 101. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653 n.8 (1983) (noting 
addition of “exceptional cases” language to § 285 was “for purposes of clarification only”); 
Hoge Warren Zimmermann Co. v. Nourse & Co., 293 F.2d 779, 783 (6th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he 
substitution of the phrase ‘in exceptional cases’ has not done away with the discretionary 
feature.”); R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden’s Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 1956) (“The phrase 
‘exceptional circumstance’ is not contained in the prior law, but confirms to the interpretation 
of the prior law by the cases.” (citation omitted)). 
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language was “substantially the same” as the existing Section 70, but that the phrase 
“‘in exceptional cases’ ha[d] been added as expressing the intention of the present 
statute as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the courts.”102 When 
questioned in a 1951 hearing about the significance of the addition of “exceptional” 
to the statutory language, P.J. Federico, Examiner-in-Chief of the USPTO and a key 
drafter of the 1952 Act, explained:  
The present statute says that the court may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party; which was introduced into the law by an act 
of 1946.  
 
 The hearings and the reports of the committees showed that they 
intended that to apply to exceptional cases without going into detail, and 
the court decisions have followed that principle of awarding attorney fees 
in exceptional cases.  
 
 What that constitutes is left, and stays left, to the discretion of the 
court that is conducting the case.103 
Thus, in many ways, Section 285 can be seen as a simple continuation of Section 
70. And, as the next subpart demonstrates, doctrine under Section 285 did in fact 
follow the same path as Section 70 for several decades, deviating only after formation 
of the Federal Circuit in 1982.  
1. Percolation from 1953 to 1982 
The regional circuits heard many more cases under Section 285 than they had 
under Section 70.104 In part, this reflected the much longer time span involved: 
Section 285 was enacted on July 19, 1952, and took effect on January 1, 1953. Patent 
appeals remained under the jurisdiction of the regional circuits until the Federal 
Circuit was formed on October 1, 1982, giving the regional circuits almost thirty 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 30 (1952). 
 103. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760 Before the Subcomm. 
No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 108–09 (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico, 
Examiner-in-Chief, U.S. Patent Office), 
http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/patentact/14_jun_1.p
df [https://perma.cc/7C52-G7X]. Federico repeated this stance in his published commentary 
on the new Patent Act. See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the new Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 
Vol. 1 (1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y (1993), 
http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/federico-commentary 
.asp#Remedies [https://perma.cc/8CKC-P8VT]; see also 98 CONG. REC. 9097 (1952) 
(statement of Sen. Wiley) (1952 bill “simply constitutes a restatement of the patent law[]”); 
98 CONG. REC. 9323 (1952) (statement of Sen. McCarran) (bill codifies “the present patent 
laws”). 
 104. A LexisAdvance search on Jan. 16, 2019, turned up 396 cases. (The search was “35 
USC 285 and attorney! fee!" from January 1, 1953 (the effective date of the 1952 Patent Act) 
to December 31, 1985 (to pick up cases in progress that were decided by the regional circuits 
after the date of creation of the Federal Circuit), and was limited to federal courts of appeals 
cases.) Not all were on point, of course. 
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years in which to develop fee-shifting doctrine under this provision. In addition, there 
was an upward trend in the number of issued patents during this time period;105 
between the increase in patent activity and the simple passage of time,106 the courts 
had more opportunity to analyze attorney fees requests. 
Despite this increased activity, there were few changes in patent fee-shifting 
doctrine following the switch from Section 70 to Section 285. The purpose of fee 
shifting remained essentially the same: to address “unnecessary and vexatious,”107 
“vexatious and unjustified,”108 or “bad faith” litigation,109 or to prevent gross 
injustice.110 The courts continued to emphasize that attorney fees were to be the 
exception, not the norm.111  
One indicator of how noncontroversial the fee-shifting doctrine of Section 285 
was when applied by the regional circuits is the dearth of contemporaneous 
commentary on the language.112 Other than Ahart’s 1975 examination of fee-shifting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm [https://perma.cc 
/VD49-VUK5] (showing an increase from less than 25,000 patents issued in 1946 to over 
63,000 issued in 1982).  
 106. An examination of the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts in five-year increments from 1952 to 1982 showed increased activity 
in patent cases filed before the district courts. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 126, tbl. C2 (1952) (525 cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 174, tbl. C2 
(1957) (630 cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 197, tbl. C2 (1962) (752 
cases); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 201, tbl. C2 (1967) (786 cases); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 286, tbl. C2 (1972) (857 cases); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 317, tbl. C2 (1977) (876 cases); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 215 tbl. C2 (1982) (836 cases). 
 107. E.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230 F.2d 855, 866 (4th Cir. 1956). 
 108. E.g., Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 263 F.2d 5, 28 (5th Cir. 
1958). 
 109. E.g., Jacquard Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 213 F.2d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 
1954).  
 110. E.g., R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden’s Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 111. See, e.g., Q-Panel Co. v. Newfield, 482 F.2d 210 (10th Cir. 1973); Binks Mfg. Co. v. 
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp., 281 F.2d 252, 260 (7th Cir. 1960); Turchan v. Cincinnati 
Milling Mach. Co., 208 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1953). 
 112. See Richard L. Stroup, Patentee’s Monetary Recovery from an Infringer, 59 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 362, 401–04 (1977) (providing two and one-half page summary of § 285); Alfred 
E. Wilson & Dwight A. Lewis, Elements of Recovery in a Patent Infringement Suit, 42 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 742, 756–71 (1960) (summarizing twelve cases that awarded fees and seventeen 
cases that denied); Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 854 
(1960) (one paragraph summary of § 285). These were cited in Gerald Rose & John E. 
Rosenquist, Attorneys’ Fees, 8 AIPLA Q. J. 66, 71 n.34 (1980); our search revealed no other 
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doctrine,113 the only other detailed analysis on the topic was a 1980 article in which 
Rose and Rosenquist provided a comprehensive overview of the then-existing state 
of case law on recovery of attorney fees in patent cases.114 They lamented the 
“diversity of viewpoint” in the published cases, asserting (without citation) that 
“[n]ot infrequently the very same act will receive opprobrium in one circuit, 
approbation in another.”115 Although their extensive review of the extant case law 
revealed some inconsistencies across the circuits,116 Rose and Rosenquist 
acknowledged that the “diverse factual situations” underlying these cases mitigated 
against the creation of “any specific formula” for evaluating attorney fee requests.117 
They identified strong doctrinal consistency across the circuits as well, finding that 
“more often than not an award of attorney fees is predicated on a multiplicity of acts 
by one of the parties, which may or may not be related, but which the court considers 
in toto to constitute bad faith.”118   
In addition, the change in language from Section 70 to Section 285 had no effect 
upon the exercise of judicial discretion by the trial courts. Awards remained firmly 
within the realm of the trial courts.119 While the regional circuits continued to instruct 
the district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to 
exercise their discretion to make attorney fee awards, they also continued to hold that 
the trial court’s decision was not to be overturned absent an abuse of that 
discretion.120 Examples of “exceptional” cases warranting the award of attorney fees 
included those where the plaintiff’s device was clearly anticipated by a prior art 
patent,121 where the plaintiff asserted positions repeatedly rejected by prior federal 
courts,122 where the plaintiff’s excessive delay in bringing suit led to extensive 
expenditures by the defendant in building its business and rendered it questionable 
                                                                                                                 
 
significant sources. 
 113. Ahart, supra note 64. 
 114. Rose & Rosenquist, supra note 112. 
 115. Id. at 71. They attributed this at least in part to the “absence of any Supreme Court 
pronouncement” on the topic. Id. 
 116. For example, they summarized the outcomes in cases involving fraud on the Patent 
Office thus: (1) almost all courts will award attorney fees where the conduct was actual fraud; 
(2) many courts will award fees where there was deceptive intent but no actual fraud; and (3) 
the courts divide on awarding fees where there was no deceptive intent but there was a material 
nondisclosure or misrepresentation. Id. at 87–88.  
 117. Id. at 74. 
 118. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 74, 82. 
 119. See, e.g., True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 508–09 (10th Cir. 
1979); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 597 (7th Cir. 1971); 
Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 480–81 (8th Cir. 1965). In the words of the Ninth Circuit, 
“This change in language certainly did not enlarge the judicial discretion of the trial judge; 
neither did it take any portion away.” Florida Brace Corp. v. Bartels, 332 F.2d 337, 339 (9th 
Cir. 1964). 
 120. See, e.g., Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 415 F.2d 373, 380 (2d Cir. 1969); Sarkes 
Tarzian, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 351 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1965); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 
474, 479 (8th Cir. 1965). 
 121. See Lincoln v. Mademoiselle Fur Specialties Corp., 131 U.S.P.Q. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
 122. See Plymouth Rubber Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 203 F. Supp. 595 (D. 
Mass. 1962), appeal dismissed, modified on other grounds, 321 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1963). 
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whether plaintiff had a bona fide belief in the validity of its patent,123 and where lack 
of candor in answering interrogatories and a request for admissions indicated bad 
faith conduct of litigation.124  
In sum, thirty-five years of percolation in the regional circuits under Sections 70 
and 285 resulted in a patent fee-shifting doctrine that was notably noncontroversial 
and stable and that was grounded in the notion that bad-faith behavior or gross 
injustice could warrant fee shifting. However, the creation of the Federal Circuit in 
1982, and the consequent loss of percolation, sent patent fee-shifting doctrine down 
a different path oriented less toward trial court discretion and more toward a 
formulaic application of rules. 
2. The Creation of the Federal Circuit and the End of Percolation: 1982–2014 
The Federal Circuit was formed on October 1, 1982, and issued its first opinion 
four weeks later, in which it adopted as binding precedent the holdings of its two 
predecessor courts: the United States Court of Claims and the United States Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals.125 However, the new court declared itself not bound by 
the decisions of the regional circuit courts of appeals,126 as the patent doctrine of 
those courts was often in conflict, and “resolution of conflict” was “a major element” 
of the new court’s mission.127 The Federal Circuit thus indicated it would draw only 
selectively upon the earlier body of precedent created by the regional circuits.128  
Patent fee-shifting cases quickly came before the newly formed Federal Circuit.129 
Initially, the outcomes reached were consistent with the earlier cases decided by the 
regional circuits. For example, the early Federal Circuit found “exceptional” 
circumstances warranting attorney-fee awards where there was fraud in obtaining the 
patent at issue, misconduct during litigation and assertion of infringement in bad 
faith;130 maintenance of a suit knowing the asserted patent was invalid;131 unfairness, 
bad faith, or inequitable conduct by a patent owner bringing an unsuccessful 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. See Merry Hull & Co. v. Hi-Line Co., 243 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
 124. See Kaehni v. Diffraction Co., 342 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1972), aff’d without op., 473 
F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 125. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (holding 
that the predecessor courts’ precedents were binding provided those holdings had been issued 
by those courts before the close of business on September 30, 1982). 
 126. Id. at 1371. Not all of the judges of the new court were comfortable with that stance. 
A concurrence in an early Federal Circuit opinion warned of the dangers of ignoring the two 
hundred years of regional circuit precedent. See Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 811 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (Nichols, J., concurring). 
 127. S. Corp., 690 F.2d at 1371.  
 128. See ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS: BLACK-LETTER LAW AND 
COMMENTARY § 2.27(F), at 54–64 (2007). 
 129. See e.g., Hughes v. Novi Am., Inc., 724 F.2d 122 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rosemount, Inc. 
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984); CTS Corp. v. Piher Int’l Corp., 
727 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 
Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Stevenson v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  
 130. Hughes, 724 F.2d at 123–25.  
 131. Id. at 123–24.  
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infringement action;132 and willful infringement on the part of the defendant.133 The 
court also affirmed denials of attorney-fee awards in cases where a motion, though 
unsuccessful, was not frivolous or brought only for harassment or delay134 or where 
the defenses raised were not used in a vexatious or dilatory manner.135 
In a decision rendered just a year and a half after the formation of the court—
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co.136—the Federal Circuit reviewed in 
considerable detail the history of fee shifting generally under U.S. law. The court 
there explained that even in the absence of a statutory provision, the courts had long 
had the power to make an equitable award of attorney fees in “especially compelling” 
circumstances, such as a party acting in contempt of court, bad-faith behavior by a 
litigant, or the existence of a contractual agreement between the parties permitting 
fee shifting.137 In addition, Congress has the legislative power to provide for fee 
shifting. Statutory deviations from the American Rule, the Rohm & Haas court noted, 
were often intended to “encourag[e] suits to vindicate congressional policy by 
‘private attorneys general’” (e.g., as in the case of certain antitrust or environmental 
statutes).138 However, the types of public policy-based concerns that underlie typical 
statutory provisions for fee shifting make only a limited appearance in patent law, 
arising largely in the context of fee shifting in favor of a party who successfully 
invalidates a “fraudulent” patent.139 More commonly, fee shifting in the patent 
context is intended to address private concerns of a litigant by preventing 
“injustice.”140 Thus, the Rohm & Haas court asserted, previous decisions by the 
regional circuits awarding attorney fees under Section 70 or Section 285 did so only 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. See Stevenson, 713 F.2d 705.  
 133. See, e.g., Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 134. E.g., CTS Corp., 727 F.2d 1550. 
 135. E.g.,  Stickle, 716 F.2d 1550. 
 136. 736 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The opinion was written by Judge Giles Rich, a key 
drafter of the 1952 Patent Act. It addressed an issue of first impression: does Section 285 
authorize attorney fees for an exceptional appeal? Id. at 689–90. The court concluded “yes.” 
Id. at 692. 
 137. Id. at 690 (citing MARY FRANCES DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES ¶ 1.02 (1983)). 
 138. Id. (citing Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379; Clayton Act of 
1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012)); Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2034 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) 
(2012))). 
 139. Id. at 692 (acknowledging the “frequently-cited policy considerations” underlying 
such awards (citing True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 509 (10th Cir. 
1979); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 
294 (9th Cir. 1969))). 
 140. Id.  
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in “extraordinary circumstances,”141 which included “willful and deliberate 
infringement by an infringer” and “prolongation of litigation in bad faith.”142  
One notable aspect of the Rohm & Haas analysis was the Federal Circuit’s easy 
acceptance of the fee-shifting precedents created by the regional circuits prior to the 
court’s formation in 1982. Although fee-shifting in patent cases was at that point 
(and had been for almost four decades) statutory in nature,143 the doctrine still carried 
equitable overtones that fostered flexible, fact-specific application of the doctrine 
and that respected exercise of discretion by the trial court.  
As the Federal Circuit matured over the next couple of decades, however, it forged 
new paths for patent doctrine that deviated significantly from the pre-1982 doctrine 
developed by the regional circuits. In particular, over time, the Federal Circuit 
became prone to drafting bright-line rules, such as its “machine or transformation” 
test for physical subject matter,144 its “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for 
nonobviousness,145 or its “general rule” that injunctive relief should be routinely 
granted for patent infringement.146 The Supreme Court regularly rejected many of 
these formulaic rules on appeal, demanding more nuanced approaches instead.147 In 
addition to this tendency toward bright-line rules, Federal Circuit decision-making 
began showing a marked blurring between the role of appellate and trial courts, with 
the Federal Circuit increasingly engaging in hyperactivity by stepping into territory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. Id. at 691. The cases cited by the court all involved Section 70, however, suggesting 
the court saw no difference between the doctrine applicable under the now-repealed Section 
70 and the current Section 285. Id. at 691 n.5 (citing Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Rochester 
Ropes, 199 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1952); Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 
1951); Laufenberg, Inc. v. Goldblatt Bros., 187 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 74 F. Supp. 293, 294 (N.D. Ohio 1947)). 
 142. Id. at 692 & n.7 (citing Milgo Elec. Co. v. United Bus. Commc’n, Inc., 623 F.2d 645 
(10th Cir. 1980)). In 1990, the Federal Circuit further explained that “there is and should be 
no difference in the standards applicable to patentees and infringers who engage in bad faith 
litigation”; rather, the court noted, the “different interests” of those parties are accounted for 
“in the required evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.” Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 143. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of Section 70 of 
the Patent Act in 1946)  
 144. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 958–59 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 145. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 146. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated & 
remanded, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 147. See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604–05 (rejecting machine or transformation test); KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation test); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting 
general rule of injunctive relief in favor of consideration of equitable factors). See generally 
Dreyfuss, supra note 14; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: 
Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28 (2007); 
Gugliuzza, supra note 1; Holbrook, supra note 9; Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s 
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 
(2003); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); Thomas, supra 
note 8.  
62 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:39 
 
 
that had been reserved to the lower courts148 or even patent examiners.149 The Federal 
Circuit also began ratcheting up the burden of proof in several contexts in the mid-
1980s.150  
In the fee-shifting setting, the Federal Circuit’s formulaic tendencies came to a 
head, in 2005, in Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.,151 where the 
Federal Circuit adopted a new rule that radically restricted fee shifting under Section 
285. Under the new, much more rigid rule of Brooks Furniture, fee shifting was 
permitted in only two instances: (1) where there was material inappropriate conduct 
related either to the litigation152 or to the securing of the patent,153 or (2) when the 
litigation was both (a) “brought in subjective bad faith” and (b) “objectively 
baseless.”154  
The Brooks Furniture court also ruled that “the underlying improper conduct and 
the characterization of the case as exceptional must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence”155—a higher standard than the preponderance test that 
typically applies in civil cases.156 Brooks Furniture did not create this heightened 
burden of proof for showing exceptionality, however. Rather, the clear and 
convincing evidence standard for Section 285 determinations can be traced back to 
a 1985 opinion in which the young Federal Circuit adopted the heightened burden 
for showing invalidity and inequitable conduct before the USPTO—a completely 
different context—into the civil-litigation setting of fee-shifting doctrine.157 The net 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Rooklidge & Weil, supra note 20, at 726, 735–39 (defining “hyperactivity” and 
arguing court improperly acted as an advocate when it considered on appeal arguments not 
raised below or when it decided on appeal issues not properly preserved below); id. at 739–48 
(arguing court improperly acted as a fact-finder when it found facts rather than remanding 
after reversing the trial court or when it granted summary judgment to one party after reversing 
the grant to the other party in the absence of a cross-motion for summary judgment). 
 149. Id. at 730–35 (arguing court improperly acted as a patent examiner when, while 
engaging in claim construction, it relied upon patents not cited or considered by the patent 
examiner or applicant).  
 150. See B.D. Daniels, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Litigation: A Critique, 36 
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 408–10 (2008). Daniels also pointed to heightened standards of proof in 
invalidity, inequitable conduct, and willful infringement cases.  
 151. 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 152. Id. at 1381. The court described such behavior as including “willful infringement, 
fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious 
or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infractions.” Id. 
 153. Id. (citations omitted). The court described this as “fraud or inequitable conduct in 
procuring the patent.” Id. 
 154. Id. at 1382. In 2011, the Federal Circuit further clarified in iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 
631 F.3d 1372, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2011), that objectively baseless litigation is “so 
unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed” and that subjective 
bad faith litigation arises when the plaintiff “actually know[s]” that the litigation is objectively 
baseless. 
 155. 393 F.3d at 1382 (citing Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 
1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).  
 156. See Daniels, supra note 150, at 373 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 
(Fed. Cir. 1979)). 
 157. See Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (citing Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that 
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result of the Federal Circuit’s narrow and inflexible formula and elevated burden of 
proof for fee-shifting evaluations was that trial-court discretion was severely 
curtailed and cases in which fee shifting under Section 285 occurred were few in 
number and difficult to prove.158  
The switch from the percolation-rich environment of the regional circuits to the 
specialized setting of the Federal Circuit had profound effects upon the development 
of patent fee-shifting doctrine. Doctrine became more uniform, of course (one of the 
goals of court specialization159), but it also became undeniably more rigid and 
formalistic. In 2014, the Supreme Court made it clear that the fee-shifting doctrine 
created by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture was impermissibly divorced from 
statutory mandates; it was, in short, wrong.  
C. Octane Fitness and Highmark: Correcting the Course of Patent Fee-Shifting 
Doctrine 
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of 
Section 285 in two paired cases: Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc.,160 and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.161 Both 
cases addressed the issue of correct fee-shifting doctrine from the perspective of the 
proper role of courts in statutory interpretation. While the cases addressed different 
aspects of the Federal Circuit’s fee-shifting doctrine under Section 285, together they 
made a damning indictment of the Federal Circuit’s formalistic approach to fee 
shifting in patent cases.  
In a short opinion, Octane Fitness examined—and rejected—the Federal Circuit’s 
narrow interpretation of “exceptional” in Section 285, finding that the Federal Circuit 
had abandoned the previous “holistic, equitable approach” in applying Section 285 
in favor of an incorrect “rigid and mechanical formulation”162 that “impermissibly 
encumber[ed] the statutory grant of discretion” to the trial courts.163 The only 
constraint that the statutory language places upon that discretion is that the case be 
“exceptional.”164 Because the Patent Act itself does not define “exceptional,” the 
Court drew upon standard canons of statutory construction in ruling that 
                                                                                                                 
 
fraud on the USPTO must be shown by clear and convincing evidence)). Challenges to the 
validity of a patent remain subject to the clear and convincing evidence standard today. See 
Microsoft Corp. v i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 94 (2011). 
 158. Professor Chien, for example, found that between 2005 and 2011, fee-shifting awards 
were granted, on average, in 56 cases per year (out of 3000 patent cases filings, on average, 
per year); slightly less than one-half of the awards went to prevailing defendants. Colleen V. 
Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 377 (2012).  
 159. See COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., supra note 5, at 28–
30 (discussing advantages of court specialization).  
 160. 572 U.S. 545 (2014). 
 161. 572 U.S. 559 (2014). While separate actions, these two cases were argued before the 
Court on the same day (Feb. 26, 2014) and decided on the same day (April 29, 2014).  
 162. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 550. 
 163. Id. at 553.  
 164. Id.  
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“exceptional” should be given its “ordinary meaning”165: a case “that stands out from 
others with respect to” either (1) “the substantive strength of a party’s litigating 
position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case)” or (2) “the 
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”166 The Court noted, almost as 
an aside, that the fee-shifting language in the Lanham and Patent Acts is identical,167 
and it cited Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant,168 a 1985 
decision from the D.C. Circuit written by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
joined by then-Judge Antonin Scalia.169 The Noxell court had found that 
“exceptional,” for purposes of Lanham Act fee shifting, “is most reasonably read to 
mean what the word is generally understood to indicate—uncommon, not run-of-the-
mine.”170 The Supreme Court adopted the same commonsense definition of 
“exceptional” for purposes of the Patent Act.171  
The Octane Fitness Court then ruled that determinations of whether cases are 
“exceptional” are to be made by the trial courts “in the case-by-case exercise of their 
discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.”172 The Brooks Furniture 
test was, the Court found, “overly rigid,”173 because it “superimpose[d] an inflexible 
framework onto statutory text that [was] inherently flexible.”174 Although the 
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s standard for being overly formulaic, 
the Court itself fell back a bit on formulaic standards by listing in a footnote the 
“‘nonexclusive’ list of ‘factors’” that it had noted in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.175 and 
that trial courts had considered in the past when applying a similar (but not identical) 
fee-shifting provision under the Copyright Act:176 “frivolousness, motivation, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 554. 
 167. Id. 
 168. 771 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
 169. Both of them of course had been elevated to the Supreme Court by the time of the 
Octane Fitness decision. The court in Noxell had noted the “terse” and “thin” nature of the 
legislative history underlying Section 1117(a), yet also emphasized that nothing in that 
legislative history suggested an overly narrow reading of the grounds for fee recovery. Id. at 
526; see also infra notes 221–28 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of 
Section 1117(a) of Lanham Act).  
 170. 771 F.2d at 526.  
 171. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554. However, the Supreme Court transcribed “run-of-
the-mine” to “run-of-the-mill” in quoting Noxell.  
 172. Id. at 554.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 555. The first category of cases listed in Brooks Furniture—those involving 
certain types of misconduct—were largely categories of conduct that would be independently 
sanctionable, which the Court found was too narrow a definition of exceptional. 
“[U]nreasonable conduct,” even if not “independently sanctionable,” may be so exceptional 
as to warrant fee shifting. Id. The second category was likewise too restrictive as the Court 
found that either subjective bad faith or meritless claims might render a case exceptional; both 
elements were not required. Id. 
 175. Id. at 554 n.6 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994)). 
 176. The Copyright Act fee-shifting provision states: “Except as otherwise provided by 
this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part 
of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
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objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) 
and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation 
and deterrence.”177 The Octane Fitness Court cautioned, however, that there was 
“‘no precise rule or formula’” to be followed in Patent Act fee-shifting evaluations; 
rather, these factors should guide the trial court’s exercise of “equitable 
discretion.”178 
The Court noted that the “demanding” standard of Brooks Furniture made Section 
285 “largely superfluous.”179 The courts already have the inherent, common law 
power to award attorney fees for “willful disobedience of a court order” or “when 
the losing party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons.’”180 In two earlier cases in other contexts, the Court had declined to construe 
fee-shifting statutes so narrowly as to make them superfluous, and it declined to do 
so in the context of Section 285 as well.181  
Having overruled the Federal Circuit’s standard for exceptionality, the Octane 
Fitness Court turned to a second ground on which it reversed Federal Circuit 
doctrine: the burden of proof for Section 285 determinations. Since 1985, Federal 
Circuit precedent had required that a prevailing party show entitlement to attorney 
fees by “clear and convincing evidence.”182 This, the Supreme Court noted, was not 
supported by the language of Section 285 or by precedent addressing other fee-
shifting statutes.183 The “preponderance of the evidence standard” is the correct one 
for most civil actions, including patent infringement litigation,184 as it enables both 
litigants to “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.”185 In the absence of 
legislative direction, the Federal Circuit had no basis for imposing this heightened 
standard of proof for Section 285 claims.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19). 
 178. Id. at 554 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534). The Fogerty Court stated that prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants should be treated alike under the copyright fee-shifting provision, 
and that awards were in the discretion of the trial court. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534. The Court 
noted: “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations, but instead 
equitable discretion should be exercised in light of the considerations we have identified.” Id. 
In a footnote, the Fogerty Court further explained that “[s]ome courts . . . have suggested 
several nonexclusive factors to guide courts’ discretion. . . . These factors include 
‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal 
components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 
compensation and deterrence.’” Id. at n.19 (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 
151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 179. Octane Fitness 572 U.S. at 557. 
 180. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 
(1975)).  
 181. Id. (citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978) (fee shifting 
under Title VII); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (per 
curiam) (fee shifting under the Civil Rights Act of 1964)). 
 182. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 183. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted). 
 184. Id. at 557–58 (citation omitted). 
 185. Id. (citation omitted). 
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In a short, unanimous opinion, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management 
System, Inc.,186 the Supreme Court followed up on the Octane Fitness holdings by 
overruling the Federal Circuit on yet a third ground: the standard for review for 
determinations of exceptionality under Section 285. Under Supreme Court 
precedent, questions of law are reviewed de novo, questions of fact are reviewed for 
“clear error,” and discretionary decisions are reviewed for “abuse of discretion.”187  
The panel majority in Highmark found that a complicated, tri-part review standard 
applied to Section 285 determinations. The objective baselessness standard of Brooks 
Furniture was “a question of law based on underlying mixed questions of law and 
fact” and thus was reviewed de novo.188 The subjective bad faith prong of Brooks 
Furniture was to be reviewed for “clear error,”189 and the trial court’s ultimate 
decision to award fees or not was to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.190 The 
introduction of de novo review into the fee-shifting context was a sharp departure 
from previous Federal Circuit precedent, which had recognized the unique role that 
the trial court plays in such determinations because of its unparalleled familiarity 
with the case.191 It did, however, fit into a larger pattern of the Federal Circuit 
adopting de novo review for issues such as claim construction,192 willfulness,193 
obviousness,194 and enablement,195 in contravention of prior precedent.  
This issue proved divisive amongst the Federal Circuit judges. At the panel level, 
Judge Mayer wrote a scathing dissent on the application of the de novo standard in 
this context, in which he stated: “Our increasing infatuation with de novo review of 
factual determinations began with claim construction, and has now infected review 
of both willful infringement, and section 285 exceptional case determinations.”196 
The Federal Circuit’s “overreaching,” he contended, had turned “litigation before the 
district court [into] a mere dress rehearsal for the command performance” before the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. 572 U.S. 559 (2014). 
 187. Id. at 563 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988)). 
 188. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), vacated, 572 U.S. 559 (2014).  
 189. Id. at 1310. 
 190. Id. at 1322–23 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 191. See, e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1582 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (“For fee-shifting issues particular deference is due to the trial judge, who had the 
opportunity to observe those intangibles missing from the appellate record. The trial court is 
in the best position to evaluate the conduct of the parties throughout the period of patent 
infringement, and to allocate the burdens of litigation commensurate with the interest of 
justice.”); see also Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the appellate court lacks the familiarity of the trial court with the details of the 
litigation). 
 192. See e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 193. See e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L.Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 194. See e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 195. See e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 196. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1320 (Mayer, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 572 U.S. 559 (2014). 
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appellate court.197 A request for rehearing en banc was denied in a six to five vote,198 
with Judge Moore, writing for the dissent, arguing that the panel majority’s rule 
“deviates from precedent, invades the province of the fact finder, and establishes a 
review standard for exceptional case findings in patent cases that is squarely at odds 
with the highly deferential review adopted by every regional circuit and the Supreme 
Court in other areas of law.”199 
On review, the Supreme Court noted that Octane Fitness, issued earlier the same 
day, had established that not only does the clear language of Section 285 commit 
determination of exceptionality to the discretion of the district court, but that the 
district court “lives with the case over a prolonged period of time,”200 rendering it 
better situated than the appellate court to make such a call.201 The Federal Circuit had 
ignored the clear hierarchy of review standards set by Supreme Court precedents in 
favor of an idiosyncratic rule that discounted the trial court’s role and heightened its 
own appellate role. The Highmark Court held that the “abuse of discretion” standard 
applied to review of “all aspects” of the trial court’s determinations on Patent Act fee 
shifting.202 
Octane Fitness and Highmark were a sharp rebuke to the Federal Circuit for: (1) 
its overly rigid interpretation of statutory language; (2) imposition of an 
inappropriately high standard of proof; and (3) overly intrusive review of 
discretionary matters committed to the trial court by Congress. Although the fee-
shifting doctrine that emerged from the Federal Circuit was indeed uniform—one of 
the goals of court specialization—it was also inaccurate and displayed precisely the 
type of judicial hyperactivism scholars fear in this specialized court setting.203 One 
would hypothesize, then, that the robust percolation found in Lanham Act fee-
shifting cases, while perhaps frustrating uniformity in the short term, would lead to 
better doctrine in the long term. This is explored in the next Part. 
III. PERCOLATION AND STATUTORY FEE SHIFTING UNDER THE LANHAM ACT  
 Statutory fee-shifting made a later appearance in the Lanham Act than it did in 
the Patent Act. When it finally did arrive, in 1976, it used language identical to that 
that had been adopted in Section 285 of the Patent Act in 1952. Unlike patent fee-
shifting doctrine, however, Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrine has percolated in the 
regional circuits throughout its entire lifetime. This doctrine, at least at first glance, 
evolved to be nonuniform in at least some respects. But did this nonuniformity 
indicate a failure of percolation? This Part argues “no” because, as described below, 
the core qualities necessary for appropriate fee-shifting decisions were maintained.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 701 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (per curiam) (denial of petition for en banc review).  
 199. Id. at 1356 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of petition for en banc review). 
 200. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563–64 (2014) 
(citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1988)). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (discussing Rooklidge & Weil, supra 
note 20). 
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A. The Origins of Fee Shifting in Trademark Law  
Fee shifting in the trademark setting predates the Lanham Act. Congress enacted 
the Lanham Act in 1946204—coincidentally, the same year in which Congress 
adopted Section 70, the first patent fee-shifting statute. However, the Lanham Act, 
like its predecessor trademark act,205 made no provision for fee shifting. After 
Section 285 was adopted in the Patent Act of 1952, there were attempts to add the 
same fee-shifting language to the Lanham Act, but those efforts failed.206 
Despite the lack of statutory authority, a number of circuits had been allowing 
recovery of attorney fees in egregious trademark cases via their common-law powers 
for at least a few years prior to enactment of the Lanham Act. The seminal case is 
widely regarded as a 1941 decision by the Seventh Circuit: Aladdin Manufacturing 
Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America.207 The court there held that attorney fees could 
be recovered as compensatory damages in trademark cases if there was “fraudulent 
and wilful  infringement” by the defendant.208 The court noted that general tort 
damages are broadly defined so as to include “injury to business standing or good 
will, loss of business, additional expenses incurred because of the tort and all other 
elements of injury to the business.”209 Attorney fees, the court found, fell into this 
grouping, and so could be awarded by the court as part of an overall tort 
compensation package.210 Over the next twenty-six years, other courts granted or 
upheld attorney fees in trademark cases, often with just summary analysis.211 In the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427.  
 205. There had been attempts to enact federal trademark legislation in the late 1800s, which 
did not survive constitutional challenge; these were followed by the Trademark Act of 1905, 
ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 96, 99), amended by Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 
104, 41 Stat. 533, which was widely regarded as defective. For a general history of the 
development of federal trademark acts, see Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22 (2010); Symposium, 50th Anniversary of the Lanham Act, 86 
TRADEMARK REP. 353 (1996). 
 206. Senate Bill 2540, as amended, provided for recovery of attorney fees; it passed the 
Senate but failed to pass the House of Representatives. See S. 2540, 83d Cong. § 25 (1954). 
The Senate report accompanying the bill stated that the provision was intended to parallel the 
recently enacted Section 285 of the Patent Act. See S. REP. NO. 83-2266, at 9 (1954). H.R. 
7734, 84th Cong. § 25 (1955), had a similar provision, but failed in the Senate. 
 207. 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941) (allowing attorney fees as compensatory damages where 
defendant’s conduct was willful and fraudulent); see also S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 5 (1974) 
(“Prior to 1967, the courts in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases had 
developed an equitable doctrine holding the attorney fees are recoverable by a successful 
plaintiff, notwithstanding the absence of express statutory authority under the Lanham Act.”). 
 208. Aladdin, 116 F.2d at 716–17 (“Recoverable damages . . . include compensation for all 
injury to appellant's business arising from wrongful acts committed by appellee, provided such 
injury was the natural and proximate result of the wrongful acts.”). 
 209. Id. at 716 (citing 15 AM. JUR. §§ 133–36, 138). 
 210. Id.at 717. 
 211. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Nat’l Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1959); Maternally 
Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956); Keller Prods. v. 
Rubber Lining Corp., 213 F.2d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 1954); Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., 203 
F.2d 517, 521 (2d Cir. 1953); Capitol Tie Rak, Inc. v. Tie Rack Stores, Inc., No. 63 C 1380 
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words of the trial court in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Redlich in 1952: “There is 
nothing novel in the concept of awarding the successful party attorney’s fees paid 
and expenses incurred in litigation, stemming from the opponent’s fraudulent 
conduct and but for which the litigation would have been avoided.”212 
However, not all courts were comfortable with the notion of common-law fee 
shifting in trademark cases. A 1951 district court opinion, Century Distilling Co. v. 
Continental Distilling Corp., cautioned that “even if [the Aladdin] ruling is sound, 
the discretion must be confined within the limits set by the almost uniform trend of 
judicial decision, and is not to be exercised except in the most exceptional 
circumstances.”213 The court found no such exceptional circumstances before it.214 
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the denial of attorney fees, stating although it 
was “arguable” that the trial court had the discretion to award attorney fees as costs, 
there was no showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court that would warrant an 
overturning of the denial of such fees.215 Similarly, in 1957, the district court in 
Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing. Co. v. Davis Manufacturing. Co. declined to 
award attorney fees.216 Although it did not address Aladdin specifically, the court 
expressed skepticism with the idea of fee shifting generally in trademark cases. The 
court noted that fee shifting was not authorized by the Lanham Act and that even if 
a court of equity had the “inherent power” to award attorney fees in the absence of 
statutory authorization, there was no evidence of “bad faith or vexatious tactics” that 
would justify such an award in the case before it.217  
The availability of common-law fee shifting in trademark cases came to a head in 
1966, in a Ninth Circuit case captioned Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling 
Corp.218 The court there held that attorney fees may not be awarded in Lanham Act 
cases,219 finding that under a “long established principle,” the prevailing party cannot 
recover attorney fees “in an ordinary action at law or in equity” absent a statutory or 
contractual provision allowing the same.220 Not only did the Lanham Act not provide 
                                                                                                                 
 
1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7228, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 1966); Youthform Co. v. R.H. Macy & 
Co., 153 F. Supp. 87, 95 (N.D. Ga. 1957); Francis H. Leggett & Co. v. Premier Packing Co., 
140 F. Supp. 328, 332 (D. Mass. 1956); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Singer Upholstering & Sewing 
Co., 130 F. Supp. 205, 208 (W.D. Pa. 1955). 
 212. 109 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (emphasis omitted). The court characterized 
the defendant’s behavior as “fraudulent, deliberate, wilful and wanton in the extreme” and 
awarded attorney fees. Id. 
 213. 102 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1951). 
 214. Id. (finding the plaintiff's behavior was “not innocent or inadvertett [sic],” but neither 
was it “fraudulent”). As the court explained, “[t]here were no circumstances of palming off or 
express malice, and no deliberate attempt to destroy the defendant's business. The worst that 
can be said about the plaintiff's conduct is that it mistook its legal rights and stubbornly clung 
to its ill-advised course of conduct after it became apparent that it would be wiser to give it 
up.” Id. 
 215. Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 
1953). 
 216. 149 F. Supp. 852, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1957).  
 217. Id. 
 218. 359 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1966), aff’d, 386 U.S. 714 (1967). 
 219. Id. at 165. 
 220. Id. at 158. 
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for attorney fees, but the fact that Congress provided for fee shifting in the Patent 
Act the same year that it enacted the Lanham Act without fee shifting clearly 
indicated that Congress knew how to provide for such recovery if it so chose—and 
evidently it did not so choose in Lanham Act causes of action.221  
What is perhaps most interesting about the Ninth Circuit’s discussion is its 
implicit damning of the darker side of percolation. The court rejected the twenty-
four-year-old reasoning of Aladdin, finding that it was, in effect, built upon nothing 
more than smoke and mirrors and that it had “nothing to recommend it as authority . 
. . except its age, if that be a recommendation.”222 The Ninth Circuit was disturbed 
by what it deemed “a certain circularity in the judicial process” under which 
common-law fee shifting in trademark law had evolved. Trademark fee-shifting 
doctrine began with what the court called “a rather casual holding, citing no prior 
authority” by the Seventh Circuit in Aladdin, which was then cited and followed 
without discussion by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.223 The net result was 
the inappropriate judicial creation of a doctrine permitting fee shifting in trademark 
cases in the absence of congressional direction to allow such recovery. 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier 
Brewing Co.224 to resolve the circuit split that ensued from the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding. The Court affirmed, holding that fee shifting was not possible in the 
trademark context because while the Lanham Act laid out an extensive and detailed 
list of remedies, including injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and trebling of 
damages in appropriate instances, fee shifting was not among them.225 Exceptions to 
the American Rule, the Court stated, do not arise in “the context of statutory causes 
of action for which the legislature ha[s] prescribed intricate remedies.”226 Thus, the 
Court concluded, “[w]hen a cause of action has been created by a statute which 
expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should 
not be readily implied.”227 In addition, Congress had provided for attorney-fee 
recovery in a number of other statutes, including enacting Section 70 of the Patent 
Act the very same year the Lanham Act was enacted, and had considered but rejected 
legislation providing for trademark fee shifting on several occasions.228 Under such 
circumstances, the Fleishmann Court concluded, it would be “inappropriate” for the 
courts to extend a remedy not found in the statute.229 
Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s holding in Fleischmann. It 
responded by adding fee-shifting language, Section 1117(a), to the Lanham Act in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 221. Id. at 159. 
 222. Id. at 161. 
 223. Id. at 163.  
 224. 386 U.S. 714 (1967). 
 225. See id. at 719–20. 
 226. Id. at 719. 
 227. Id. at 720. In his dissent, Justice Stewart concluded just the opposite, arguing that, 
when it enacted the Lanham Act, Congress was aware of fee shifting under Aladdin, and chose 
not to include fee shifting in the statute so as “to preserve the rule of that case.” Id. at 722 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 228. Id. at 720–21, 720 n.16. 
 229. Id. at 721. 
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1976.230 Section 1117(a) originated in House Bill 8981,231 which was introduced at 
the behest of the Department of Commerce.232 The accompanying Senate report 
stated that the purpose of the bill was to effect “three minor changes” to the federal 
trademark statute, one of which was to “authorize award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in trademark litigation where justified by equitable 
considerations.”233 The Senate report further identified an imbalance in the federal 
intellectual property laws: while the Patent and Copyright Acts permitted the 
recovery of attorney fees in limited circumstances, the Lanham Act had no such 
provision.234 The Senate Committee also agreed with the position of the Department 
of Commerce that fee shifting in trademark cases “should be available in exceptional 
cases, i.e., in infringement cases where the acts of infringement can be characterized 
as ‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful.’”235 (These categories were to 
play a significant role in later circuit precedents.)236 Recovery was to be available to 
prevailing defendants in exceptional cases as well, to “provide protection against 
unfounded suits brought by trademark owners for harassment and the like.”237 
At the time that Congress addressed fee shifting in the trademark context, patent 
law had had almost three decades of experience with statutory attorney fees awards. 
It is not surprising, perhaps, that Congress adopted the same language in Section 
1117(a) of the Lanham Act as it had enacted over twenty years earlier in Section 285 
of the Patent Act: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”238  
Because cases under the Lanham Act go to the regional appellate courts,239 twelve 
regional circuits have had the opportunity to weigh in on what “exceptional” means 
in this context, as opposed to the single specialized circuit court that has heard all 
patent appeals post-1982. Percolation has thus been robust in the Lanham Act fee-
shifting arena. The net result, as demonstrated below, is that fee-shifting doctrine in 
Lanham Act cases evolved in such a way as to be nonuniform, yet, as the next Section 
                                                                                                                 
 
 230. Trademark Act, Pub. L. No. 93-600, § 3, 88 Stat. 1955, 1955 (1975). A previous bill, 
Senate Bill 3452, was passed by the Senate in the Ninety-Second Congress but not addressed 
by the House. 
 231. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1 (1974). 
 232. Id. at 2. 
 233. Id. at 1. The other two changes were (1) creating an automatic thirty-day extension 
upon request for the filing of an opposition to a trademark registration application without 
having to show good cause; and (2) eliminating the existing requirement that “reasons of 
appeal” be filed with the USPTO when appealing from the USPTO to the U.S. Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals. Id.  
 234. Id. at 2. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.  
 237. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (quoting Department of Commerce statement). The Lanham 
Act provision for fee shifting applies not only to violations of trademark rights, but to harmful, 
false, or misleading advertising by a competitor as well, although those cases are significantly 
fewer in number than the trademark cases. See Leighton, supra note 57, at 850. Nightingale 
Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010), discussed in 
the next Section, was, in fact, an advertising claim, not a trademark case. 
 238. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).  
 239. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); see also supra note 19 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1291).  
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demonstrates, it remained more true to legislative mandate than did the non-
percolated patent fee-shifting doctrine created by the Federal Circuit. 
B. Lanham Act Fee-Shifting Doctrine in the Regional Circuits Pre-Octane Fitness 
Statutory fee shifting under Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act started out on a 
very different foot than did statutory fee shifting under the Patent Act. As noted 
above, the legislative history of the Lanham Act listed four categories of infringing 
acts by defendants that would justify fee awards to trademark owners—infringing 
acts that could be labeled as “‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful”240—
as well as providing for awards to prevailing defendants where the trademark 
owner’s wrongful behavior warranted it.241 By contrast, the legislative history of 
Section 70 of the Patent Act set forth no such guiding principles, containing only a 
broad reference to the prevention of “gross injustice.”242 
Several early decisions under Section 1117(a) seized upon these four categories—
malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful acts—as though they were the 
touchstones for determining whether a Lanham Act case was sufficiently exceptional 
to support a fee award.243 Unless the infringement fell into one of these 
classifications, the case was not exceptional and attorney fees were unavailable. 
Although these decisions carry faint whiffs of the Federal Circuit’s formulaic 
approach to fee shifting in patent cases, which was so sharply slapped down by the 
Supreme Court in Octane Fitness in 2014, the approach of the regional circuits is 
much more understandable in the Lanham Act context. Not only did the legislative 
history specifically call out these behaviors as the types that would render a case 
“exceptional,” the Senate report did so in a clause that was preceded by “i.e.” and 
not “e.g.,”244 which might indeed lead a reader to infer that the labeled behaviors 
were a closed set and not merely exemplars of the type of behavior that could justify 
fee shifting.  
The first three and half decades of Section 1117(a)’s existence saw a steady stream 
of appellate decisions on fee shifting under the Lanham Act.245 As could be expected, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2. 
 241. Id. at 6. 
 242. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of 
Section 70). 
 243. See, e.g., Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 
1985); Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048, 1052 (6th Cir. 1982); VIP Food, Inc. v. Vulcan 
Pet, Inc., 675 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 1982); Tex. Pig Stands, Inc., v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, 
Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 696–97 (5th Cir. 1952). The Seventh Circuit stated that these four factors 
formed a “canonical formula” for the circuits to follow. See Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door 
Sys., 126 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases). Although most circuits listed 
these factors in the disjunctive—“or”—as it appears in the initial part of the Senate report, S. 
REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2, the Eleventh Circuit actually listed the factors in the conjunctive—
“and”—as the language appeared in the latter part of the report, id. at 5. See, e.g., St. Charles 
Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 737 F.2d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 1983); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of 
Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 846 (11th Cir. 1983).  
 244. S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2. 
 245. See, e.g., TE-TA-MA Truth Found.-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the 
Creator, 392 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 2004); Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724 (6th 
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the robust percolation environment of the regional circuits, coupled with the 
uncabined language of Section 1117(a) and sparse legislative history, led to divergent 
language regarding the standard for exceptionality. In particular, the circuit courts 
often explicitly discussed “bad faith” behavior in discussing what made a Lanham 
Act case exceptional,246 harkening back to the common-law grounds for fee shifting 
in trademark cases247 (and indeed, to the early days of Patent Act fee shifting as 
well).248 The courts did not use consistent vocabulary in addressing the role of bad 
faith. One court suggested that bad faith was a “shorthand” for the high degree of 
culpability required under the four-factor inquiry suggested by the legislative 
history.249 Some used “bad faith” as one of several factors to consider (i.e., was the 
losing party’s claim “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad 
faith[?]”).250 A finding of bad faith acts was not considered a prerequisite to 
recovery;251 rather, “something less” in terms of improper behavior would suffice.252 
As the Ninth Circuit phrased it, bad faith might “be part of those exceptional 
circumstances” that justify fee-shifting, but “the mere absence of bad faith” would 
not necessarily negate such an award.253 
While one might anticipate that the regional circuit courts would reach out to the 
substantial body of case law that had developed under Section 285 of the Patent Act 
in determining what rendered a case “exceptional” given the legislative choice to 
employ identical language in these two statutory provisions, patent case law played 
a surprisingly small role in the development of Lanham Act doctrine. The Seventh 
Circuit did recognize the parallel provisions in a 2004 case, and noted that under 
                                                                                                                 
 
Cir. 2004); Tamko Roofing Prods. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2002); People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); 
SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1999); Pebble Beach 
Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998); Post Office v. Portec, Inc., 913 F.2d 802 
(10th Cir. 1990). 
 246. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985); Burndy 
Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 748 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1984); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway 
Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1168 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 247. See supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text.  
 248. See supra Sections II.A, B. 
 249. Proctor, 280 F.3d at 527 (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 
556 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
 250. Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Scott Fetzer Co. v. Williamson, 101 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 1996)); see also Hartman v. 
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1987).  
 251. An exception appears to have been the Eleventh Circuit, which required a prevailing 
defendant to show “bad faith” acts by the plaintiff, while requiring a prevailing plaintiff to use 
the four factors listed in the legislative history. Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 
1319 n.10, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 252. Ji v. Bose Corp., 626 F.3d 116, 129 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l 
Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F. 3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2000); Door Sys., 
Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 126 F.3d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1997); Noxell Corp. v. 
Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 525–26 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 253. Stephen W. Boney, Inc., 127 F.3d at 827 (citations omitted). 
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Supreme Court precedent, “similar language” in fee-shifting statutes “is ‘a strong 
indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.”254 The court concluded that as cases 
under the Patent Act had been deemed exceptional where the losing party had 
“engaged in vexatious litigation conduct,”255 a prevailing plaintiff could be awarded 
fees under the Lanham Act “where the defendant’s litigation conduct was 
oppressive.”256 The Third Circuit noted that Section 285 case law did not require 
willful behavior to support fee shifting under the Patent Act and determined that 
Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act should follow suit.257 Generally, though, the 
regional circuits paid little attention to the similarity of the two provisions. 
The variations in language employed by the circuit courts in interpreting Section 
1117(a) attracted the attention of a few courts and commentators.258 In particular, in 
2010, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit addressed the various approaches of the 
circuits in an opinion captioned Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne 
Therapy, LLC.259 He there attempted to categorize and summarize the then-existing 
interpretations of “exceptional” in the context of Lanham Act fee shifting across the 
various circuits before setting forth yet an even different standard for the Seventh 
Circuit. In so doing, he painted an unfavorable, yet not entirely accurate, picture of 
the effects of percolation on the uniformity (or lack thereof) in Lanham Act fee-
shifting doctrine. 
According to Judge Posner’s analysis, four circuits—the Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and 
D.C. Circuits—adopted different tests based upon whether the plaintiff or the 
defendant prevailed.260 In the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, a prevailing plaintiff was 
required to show the infringement was willful or in bad faith, while a prevailing 
defendant could show “‘something less than bad faith’ by the plaintiff.”261 The Tenth 
Circuit required a prevailing plaintiff to show bad faith (but apparently did not 
consider willfulness), but, like the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, imposed a lower 
standard for a prevailing defendant (albeit phrased differently than the test imposed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 254. TE-TA-MA Truth Found.-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 392 
F.3d 248, 392 F.3d 248, 261 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. 
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 759 n.2 (1989)); accord CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 
F.2d 60, 65 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 255. TE-TA-MA Truth Found.-Family of URI, 392 F.3d at 262 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, 
Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 831 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).  
 256. Id. at 263; see also Int’l Olympic Comm. v. S.F. Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 739 
(9th Cir. 1986) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2 (1974)) (ruling on role of willfulness in fee 
awards). 
 257. Securacomm, 224 F.3d 273, 280–81 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 258. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 
223 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 
F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1992); Anne M. Mellen, Case Note, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under the 
Lanham Act: Egregious Litigation Conduct in the “Exceptional” Case, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1111 (2006). 
 259. 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 260. Id. at 960. 
 261. Id. (such as “economic coercion, groundless arguments, and failure to cite controlling 
law” (citing Retail Servs. Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2004); Reader’s 
Digest Ass’n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 808–09 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).  
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by those other circuits).262  The Sixth Circuit referred back to the “canonical formula” 
found in the legislative history263 and relied upon by early courts264 in maintaining 
that the prevailing plaintiff had to show the infringement was “malicious, fraudulent, 
willful, or deliberate,” while a prevailing defendant had to show the suit was 
“oppressive.”265 
The Nightingale analysis stated that three circuits—the Second, Fifth, and 
Eleventh—required that the prevailing party, whether defendant or plaintiff, show 
that the opponent litigated in bad faith or, if the defendant prevailed, that the suit was 
fraudulent.266 The First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits did not require a showing 
of bad faith267 but articulated a variety of other standards. The First Circuit, for 
example, stated that a showing of “‘willfulness short of bad faith or fraud [would] 
suffice when equitable considerations justify an award’” and the lower court 
adequately supported its finding of exceptionality.268 The Third Circuit required a 
showing of “culpable conduct on the part of the losing party,” but noted that that 
conduct could take “‘a variety of forms’” and could vary depending upon the specific 
circumstances of a case.269 The Ninth Circuit stated that while bad faith may suffice, 
“‘other exceptional circumstances’” could also justify an award,270 although a later 
case added the gloss that “exceptional” meant that “the defendant acted maliciously, 
fraudulently, deliberately, or willfully” (the four factors from the legislative history) 
or that the plaintiff’s case was “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in 
bad faith.”271  
The Nightingale court ultimately adopted yet a different test for Lanham Act fee 
shifting: the “abuse of process” standard. This standard defined an “exceptional” case 
under the Lanham Act as one in which: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 262. Id. (requiring one of four showings: (1) bad faith in bringing the suit; (2) “lack of any 
foundation” for the suit; (3) “unusually vexatious and oppressive” prosecution of the suit; or 
(4) “perhaps for other reasons as well” (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, 223 
F.3d at 1147)). According to Judge Posner, the breadth of the fourth factor meant the Tenth 
Circuit could “hardly be said to have a test.” Id. 
 263. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 265. Nightingale, 626 F.2d at 960 (citing Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724, 
728 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 266. Id. at 960–61 (citing Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 221–22 
(2d Cir. 2003); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 527–28 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001); Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. 
Morgan Tire & Auto, Inc., 253 F.3d 1332, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). The Fifth 
Circuit added the gloss that in evaluating a prevailing defendant’s request for attorney fees, 
the court should “consider the merits and substance of the civil action when examining the 
plaintiffs’ good or bad faith.” Procter & Gamble, 280 F.3d at 528.  
 267. Nightingale, 626 F.3d at 961.  
 268. Id. (quoting Tamko Roofing Products, Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st 
Cir. 2002)). 
 269. Id. (quoting Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d 
Cir. 2000)). 
 270. Id. (quoting Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Services, Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th 
Cir. 1997)). 
 271. Id. (quoting Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 615 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
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the losing party was the plaintiff and was guilty of abuse of process in 
suing, or . . . the losing party was the defendant and had no defense yet 
persisted in the trademark infringement . . . for which he was being sued, 
in order to impose costs upon his opponent.272  
If the Nightingale court’s goal was to bring uniformity to the Lanham Act fee-
shifting doctrine, it failed. No other circuit has considered, much less adopted, the 
Seventh Circuit’s “abuse of process” standard. Only one, the Eighth Circuit, has even 
cited Nightingale’s summary of the circuit courts’ approaches.273  
If the Nightingale court’s goal was simply to illustrate unacceptable schisms in 
doctrine as a result of percolation through the regional circuits, it likewise failed. 
Judge Posner engaged in meticulous parsing of the regional circuits’ precedents to 
argue that percolation led to a fragmented, incorrect doctrine. In trying to explain the 
resultant disarray in Lanham Act fee shifting across the various circuits, he turned to 
the concept of “circuit drift”: “the heavy caseloads and large accumulations of 
precedent in each circuit induce courts of appeal to rely on their own ‘circuit law,’ 
as if each circuit were a separate jurisdiction rather than all being part of a single 
national judiciary enforcing a uniform body of federal law.”274  
Did percolation hinder the formation of consistent Lanham Act fee-shifting 
doctrine? This is unclear. Circuit differences in doctrine are an expected consequence 
(and some would argue major benefit) of percolation and ought not to be regarded as 
suspect in and of themselves.275 As Judge Posner himself pointed out, we can point 
to the many different articulations of fee-shifting doctrine used by the circuits in 
Lanham Act cases and identify linguistic variations and disparities, but it is very 
difficult to sort out whether these differences in language lead to a difference in 
outcomes.276 Attorney fee awards are based on factual circumstances best known by 
(and perhaps at times even known only to) the trial court judge who lives with the 
case, often for years. It is virtually impossible to evaluate how much, if any, 
difference the various regional circuit iterations of the Lanham Act fee-shifting 
doctrine made in actual outcomes because of the difficulty in finding identical fact 
patterns in different circuits that would allow accurate comparisons of outcomes. 
Although accuracy of outcomes is hard to evaluate, accuracy of doctrine is easier 
to assess. As the next Section demonstrates, Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrine, 
despite its percolation-engendered nonuniformities, was demonstrably more 
consistent with the Court’s three edicts in Octane Fitness and Highmark than was 
the patent fee-shifting doctrine developed by the specialized Federal Circuit. As 
discussed below, less correction was necessary and the overall direction of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 272. Id. at 963–64. 
 273. Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit continued to apply its own previous standard of 
exceptionality that required actions that were “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued 
in bad faith.” Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 650 F.3d 1139, 1152 (8th Cir. 
2011); see also Cmty. Christ Copyright Corp. v. Devon Park Restoration Branch of Jesus 
Christ’s Church, 634 F.3d 1005, 1013 (8th Cir. 2011) (same).  
 274. Nightingale, 626 F.3d at 962. 
 275. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 276. Nightingale, 626 F.3d at 962 (“To decide whether the standards differ more than 
semantically would require a close study of the facts of each case.”). 
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trademark case law did not shift significantly following the two Supreme Court 
cases. 
 C. Lanham Act Fee-Shifting Doctrine in the Regional Circuits Post-Octane Fitness 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court made three key rulings in Octane Fitness 
and Highmark: (1) determinations of exceptionality, which is defined by its “ordinary 
meaning,” are to be made by the trial court in a case-specific exercise of discretion 
based on the totality of the circumstances;277 (2) evidence of exceptionality need only 
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence;278 and (3) and the trial court’s 
decisions regarding exceptionality are subject to review for abuse of discretion and 
not de novo.279 These errors in Patent Act fee-shifting doctrine had evolved under 
the Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction and were not products of the percolating 
patent doctrine that applied prior to formation of the court in 1982.  
Despite recognizing the identical language of the two statutory provisions and 
citing a Lanham Act case, Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant,280 
the Supreme Court did not address whether its analyses of fee shifting under Section 
285 of the Patent Act also applied to fee shifting under Section 1117(a) of the 
Lanham Act. However, since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Octane Fitness and 
Highmark, every circuit except the Tenth and the D.C. Circuits has had the 
opportunity to address fee shifting under the Lanham Act. Every one of those circuits 
except the Seventh Circuit has determined that the Octane Fitness standard for 
exceptionality should apply to Lanham Act fee shifting as well,281 given the “clear 
guidance” of the Court in the context of Section 285 as well as “the parallel purpose, 
structure, and language” of the two sections.282 By comparing Lanham Act fee-
                                                                                                                 
 
 277. See supra notes 154–73 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 185–201 and accompanying text. 
 280. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 (2014) (citing 
Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 525–26 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).  
 281. See Sleepy’s, LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 909 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 2018); 
Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photos & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313 (8th Cir. 2018); 
Scholz v. Goudrea, 901 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2018); Tobinik v. Novella, 884 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 
2018); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Second 
Circuit precedent); Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(en banc) (per curiam); Baker v. DeShong, 821 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2016); Georgia-Pac. 
Consumer Prods., L.P. v. Von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 2015); Slep-Tone Entm’t. 
Corp. v. Karaoke Kandy Store, Inc., 782 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 2015); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. 
Dempster, 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014). In its single post-Octane Fitness examination of 
Lanham Act fee-shifting, the Seventh Circuit applied its 2010 abuse of process standard 
without reference to the Supreme Court’s ruling. Burford v. Accounting Practice Sales, Inc., 
786 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2015). Although the issue has not yet arisen in the D.C. Circuit post-
Octane Fitness, we can assume little or no change in precedent is required in that circuit as its 
Noxell opinion formed part of the basis for the Supreme Court’s reasoning. See supra notes 
160–63 and accompanying text. 
 282. Baker, 821 F.3d at 624 (citing Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d 303); see also Ballero v. 
727 Inc., 774 F. App’x 871 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); Sunearth, Inc., 839 F.3d at 1180 
(citing Georgia-Pac. Consumer Prods., 781 F.3d at 720). 
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shifting doctrines to these three rulings, we can get a sense of whether percolation 
results in more accurate legal doctrine than does uniform doctrine developed by a 
specialized court. Our analysis indicates that while the regional circuits were required 
to make adjustments to their exceptionality doctrines post-Octane Fitness, those 
revisions were relatively minor. Moreover, their doctrines already conformed to the 
Supreme Court’s rulings on the burden of proof and standard of review applicable 
under the statutory language. 
First, in the ten regional circuits that have reviewed and adopted for purposes of 
Section 1117(a) the Supreme Court’s definition of “exceptional” under Section 285, 
we do see some shifts in the standards, largely based on rolling back the role of “bad 
faith” in determining exceptionality. “Bad faith” played a prominent, if not 
necessarily determinative, role in most circuits’ Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrine 
pre-Octane Fitness.283 In Octane Fitness, however, the Supreme Court made it clear 
that a case could be exceptional even if misbehavior of “less than bad faith” was 
involved.284 As a result, the circuit courts had to reassess and recalibrate their 
Lanham Act fee-shifting doctrines.  
This did not require radical doctrinal change. In one of the earliest appellate cases 
to address this topic post-Octane Fitness, Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,285 the 
Third Circuit found that its previous fee-shifting standard had to be “slightly altered” 
to satisfy the Supreme Court’s holding.286 Under prior Third Circuit precedent, the 
trial court first determined whether the defendant had engaged in “any culpable 
conduct,” which included, in a nonexclusive list, “bad faith, fraud, malice, and 
knowing infringement.”287 If the trial court found culpable conduct on the part of the 
losing party, the court would then consider whether the circumstances were 
sufficiently “exceptional” to support a fee award.288 The Third Circuit found that 
after Octane Fitness, it was inappropriate to “cabin” the trial court’s discretion by 
imposing a “threshold requirement that the losing party acted culpably;”289 rather, 
Supreme Court analysis made clear that “exceptionally meritless claims” may also 
warrant fee shifting.290 The Third Circuit’s precedent was thus too restrictive and 
could not stand. 
Several other circuits likewise found that their standards needed revising to 
diminish the role of bad faith in Lanham Act fee shifting post-Octane Fitness. The 
Second Circuit abandoned its precedents requiring actions such as “‘evidence of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 283. See supra notes 237–45 and accompanying text.  
 284. Octane-Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555 (“[W]e think it fair to assume that Congress did not 
intend rigidly to limit recovery of fees by a [Lanham Act] defendant to the rare case in which 
a court finds that the plaintiff ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons’ . . . . Something less than ‘bad faith,’ we believe, suffices to mark a case as 
‘exceptional.’” (quoting Noxell, 771 F.2d at 526) (alterations in original)). 
 285. 764 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 286. Id. at 315. 
 287. Id. at 314. 
 288. Id. (citing Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
 289. Id. at 315. 
 290. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555. Culpability might influence the trial court’s analysis 
of exceptionality, but it was no longer a mandatory first step in evaluating a fee-award request. 
Fair Wind Sailing, 764 F.3d at 315. 
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fraud or bad faith’” or whether the lawsuit “was ‘initiated as a competitive ploy’” or 
begun “‘in bad faith merely to join in the profits from [the defendant].’”291 The 
Fourth Circuit found that, post-Octane Fitness, the losing party’s actions “need not 
have been independently sanctionable or taken in bad faith” to support a finding of 
exceptionality.292 The Fifth Circuit held that there could no longer be “a rigid 
standard of culpable conduct” or a requirement of bad faith.293 The Eighth Circuit 
had previously defined exceptional cases as those involving acts that were 
“groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.”294 When the issue 
arose before it in 2018, the Eighth Circuit abrogated that stance and simply adopted 
the Octane Fitness standard instead.295 
In addition to abandoning any requirement that the trial court find certain types of 
impermissible behavior, the regional circuit courts embraced the Octane Fitness 
Court’s emphasis on allowing the trial court to fully exercise the discretion granted 
to it by Congress when making exceptionality determinations. The Ninth Circuit’s 
approach in its 2016 en banc, per curiam opinion in Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar 
Power Co.296 is typical. The court noted that it historically had ruled that 
“exceptional,” within the meaning of fee shifting under the Lanham Act, required 
“‘malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful’ infringement” by defendant.297 Those 
qualifiers were now discarded and district courts in the Ninth Circuit were directed 
to examine the “totality of the circumstances” in gauging exceptionality—exercising 
their “equitable discretion”—in accordance with the Octane Fitness holding. 298 In 
doing so, the district courts should apply the Octane Fitness standard that an 
“exceptional case” under the Lanham Act is one that “stands out from others,” either 
based on the strength of the litigating positions or the manner in which the case was 
litigated.299  
                                                                                                                 
 
 291. Sleepy’s LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 909 F.3d 519, 530 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1383 (2d Cir. 1993); 
Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., 797 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1986); Mennen Co. v. Gillette 
Co., 565 F. Supp. 648, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1437 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alterations 
in original). 
 292. Verisign, Inc. v. XYZ.com LLC, 891 F.3d 481, 487-88 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 293. Baker v. DeShong, 821 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 294. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 650 F.3d 1139, 1152 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 295. Sturgis Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc., 908 F.3d 313, 346 
(8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554). A few weeks later, in a short 
decision, the Eighth Circuit cited to the adoption of the Octane Fitness standard in Sturgis 
Motorcycle Rally, Inc. in its decision in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus. Inc., 912 F.3d 
445, 454 (8th Cir. 2018), but the court also quoted a 1987 precedent that defined an exceptional 
case as one “in which a plaintiff brought an action that ‘was groundless, unreasonable, 
vexatious, or was pursued in bad faith.’” Id. (quoting Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 
F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
 296. 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 297. Id. at 1180 (quoting Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1409 (9th Cir. 
1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218). The court also noted that the district court’s decision had been 
reviewed de novo under prior precedent. Id.  
 298. Id. at 1180–81 (citing Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554). 
 299. Id. at 1080; see also Scholz v. Goudrea, 901 F.3d 37, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2018); Tobinick 
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 One unintended consequence has arisen from the Supreme Court’s citation in 
Octane Fitness of the Fogerty factors considered by the courts in evaluating fee 
shifting under the Copyright Act: “frivolousness, motivation, objective 
unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need 
in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and 
deterrence.”300 The Court’s listing of those factors in Octane Fitness is curious, as 
the fee-shifting language of the Copyright Act301 does not parallel that of the Patent 
and Lanham Acts; in particular, it is not limited to “exceptional” cases. Even the 
Supreme Court, it would seem, is not immune to the ease and allure of multifactor 
guidelines. The concern, of course, is that such guidelines may morph into mandatory 
tests. By listing these factors in Octane Fitness, the Court opened the door to the 
same type of formulaic approach that it had rejected in the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence under the Patent Act. 
And indeed, several circuits seized upon the Fogerty factors as a useful, and 
perhaps even required, roadmap in evaluating Lanham Act fee shifting in post-
Octane Fitness cases. The Ninth Circuit directed the trial court to exercise its 
“equitable discretion in light of the nonexclusive factors identified in Octane Fitness 
and Fogerty.”302 The Second Circuit recited these factors and indicated that it had 
some doubt as to whether the case at hand was “‘frivolous[]’ or improperly 
‘motivat[ed],’” and so sent it back down to the trial court for evaluation on these 
grounds.303 The First Circuit found that the trial court had not abused its discretion 
in denying an award of attorney fees, noting that the trial court had not only cited the 
Fogerty factors but had “also thoughtfully analyzed each of those factors.” 304 The 
First Circuit did not go so far as to state that a trial court must employ those factors 
in making a determination of exceptionality under the trademark statute, but it is 
clear that its use of the factors persuaded the appellate court there had been no abuse 
of discretion.305 The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, created a “three-part test”306 for 
evaluating Lanham Act fee shifting that was an amalgamation of Octane Fitness and 
the Fogerty factors,307 thus cementing Fogerty into its Lanham Act jurisprudence.  
                                                                                                                 
 
v. Novella, 884 F.3d 1110, 1118 (11th Cir. 2018); Slep-Tone Entmt’t v Karaoke Kandy Store, 
Inc., 782 F.3d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 2015); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 
315 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 300. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 
534 n.19 (1994)).   
 301. See supra note 176 (quoting Copyright Act fee-shifting language). 
 302. Sunearth, 839 F.3d at 1181 (emphasis in original). 
 303. Sleepy’s LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 909 F.3d 519, 531 n.7 (2d. Cir. 
2016) (alterations in original).  
 304. Scholz, 901 F.3d at 50.  
 305. Id. 
 306. Exclaim Mktg., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 674 F.App’x  250, 260 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 307. Georgia-Pac. Consumer Prods., L.P. v. Von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 
2015). The Fourth Circuit stated that the trial court could deem a case so “exceptional” as to 
warrant an attorney fee award if “in light of the totality of the circumstances” it finds:  
 (1) “there is an unusual discrepancy in the merits of the positions taken by the 
parties,” based on the non-prevailing party’s position as either frivolous or 
objectively unreasonable; (2) the non-prevailing party “has litigated the case in 
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In short, the regional circuits did have to adjust their Lanham Act fee-shifting 
doctrines after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Octane Fitness to comply with its 
mandates. Even after those adjustments, their doctrines do not fully align but rather 
display some variation. These adjustments and variations are relatively minor, 
however, and do not display the gross departure from statutory language and 
legislative intent that the Supreme Court chastised the Federal Circuit for in the 
Patent Act context. In this sense, we can indeed say that percolating Lanham Act 
doctrine was “more correct” than the isolated doctrine developed by the specialized 
Federal Circuit.  
Second, the regional circuits’ handling of the burden of proof issue was also 
demonstrably more correct in the Lanham Act setting than was the Federal Circuit’s 
approach in the Patent Act setting. In civil cases, the preponderance of the evidence 
standard generally applies in the absence of legislative direction to the contrary.308 
The Federal Circuit nonetheless imposed a heightened clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard, which the Octane Fitness Court overturned as being contrary to 
Section 285’s language and legislative history.309 In stark contrast, we can find no 
evidence that the regional circuits deviated from the norm of the preponderance 
standard when evaluating fee-shifting requests under Section 1117(a) of the Lanham 
Act.310 On this matter, we can confidently state that the regional circuits got the 
doctrine right while the Federal Circuit got it wrong.  
Third, the Highmark Court had overturned the Federal Circuit’s attempt to import 
a de novo review standard into Section 285 fee shifting for purposes of its “objective 
baselessness” prong of Brooks Furniture. The Court ruled that whether a case is 
exceptional is a matter of discretion and thus “all aspects” of the trial court’s 
determination are reviewable only for abuse of discretion.311 During the thirty-six 
years that Patent Act fee shifting percolated among the regional courts, the 
controlling review standard was indeed a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard312; 
it was only under the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit that the standard 
was ratcheted up and divided into a complex, three-part standard of review.313  
                                                                                                                 
 
an ‘unreasonable manner;’” or (3) there is otherwise “the need in particular 
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”  
Id. at 721 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 
n.6 (2014); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 2014)). The first 
two parts draw on the Octane Fitness standard; the third is selected from the Fogerty factors.  
 308. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).  
 309. Octane-Fitness, 572 U.S. at 557 (discussed supra notes 181–85 and accompanying 
text). 
 310. Most simply did not discuss it, but none overtly used the clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard. 
 311. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 (2014). 
 312. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577, 584 (7th Cir. 1981); Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, GmbH, 625 F.2d 580, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977); 
Norton Co. v. Carborundrum Co., 530 F.2d 435, 445 (1st Cir. 1976); Orrison v. C. Hoffberger 
Co., 190 F.2d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 1951); Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899, 903 (9th 
Cir. 1950); Blanc v. Spartan Tool Co., 168 F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1948).  
 313. See supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s tri-
part standard).  
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We do not see the same distortion of review standards in the Lanham Act fee-
shifting arena. Prior to Highmark, all circuits but the Ninth agreed that the 
determinations of whether a particular case was exceptional and if so, whether fee 
shifting was appropriate under the circumstances, were discretionary determinations 
entitled to deference.314 The Fifth Circuit—but it would appear only the Fifth—
applied the intermediate “clear error” standard to the determination of whether a case 
was exceptional.315 All agreed that whether fees were warranted under the particular 
circumstances of a case found to be exceptional was reviewable only for abuse of 
discretion.316 The Ninth Circuit stood alone in applying de novo review to the 
exceptionality determination, though it too applied the abuse of discretion standard 
to the determination to award or deny attorney fees in an exceptional case.317 Thus, 
Highmark changed legal doctrine only in the Ninth Circuit.318 The rest of the circuits 
ignored the decision as, in effect, they were already in compliance with it.319 In this 
area too, we can confidently state that the regional circuits got doctrine right while 
the Federal Circuit got it wrong.  
So where does all this parsing of case law leave us in our quest to understand the 
role that percolation versus specialization plays in doctrinal development of fee 
shifting? It is true that we saw some variation in regional circuit doctrine pre-Octane 
Fitness—and we still see strands of nonuniformity post-Octane Fitness. However, 
some variation in doctrine under percolation is to be expected; in fact, one of the 
perceived advantages of percolation is just that sort of testing of doctrine and rules.320 
The next Part explores these issues.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 314. Several circuit courts noted that the meaning of “exceptional” under the Lanham Act 
was a legal one subject to de novo review, see, e.g., Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 
F.3d 65, 81 (1st Cir. 2008); TE-TA-MA Truth. Found.-Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church 
of the Creator, 392 F.3d 248, 257 (7th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. 
v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1991), which is consistent with general norms of 
statutory interpretation and Highmark. See Highmark, 572 U.S. at 563. 
 315. See, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 537 (5th 
Cir. 2012). This is the standard that had been adopted by the Federal Circuit for determinations 
of exceptionality under Section 285 by the mid-2000s. See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar 
Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 528 F.3d 
1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 316. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in Sioux Falls v First Nat’l Bank S.D., 679 F.3d 763, 771 
(8th Cir. 2012); Ji v. Bose Corp., 626 F.3 116, 129 (1st Cir. 2010); TE-TA-MA Truth. Found., 
392 F.3d at 257; Lipscher v. LRP Pub’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2001); 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n 
of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1146; Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 503 (6th 
Cir. 1998); Goodheart Clothing Co. v. Laura Goodman Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 268, 272 (2d 
Cir. 1992); Garrett Corp. v. Am. Safety Flight Sys., Inc., 502 F.2d 9, 22 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 317. See Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 318. See Sunearth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
 319. See, e.g., Premium Balloon Access, Inc. v. Creative Balloons Mfg., 573 F. App’x. 
547, 558 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 320. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (summarizing Estreicher & Sexton’s 
analysis of the benefits of percolation). 
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IV. LEARNINGS FROM THE PERCOLATION “EXPERIMENT” 
The doctrinal history of fee shifting provides a rich setting for understanding the 
role of percolation, a concept that was previously assessed only in theory. We believe 
the presence of identical statutory language in two highly related areas of law serves 
as a uniquely reliable grounding for a number of insights. These are particularly 
relevant for understanding the way in which percolation shapes statutory 
interpretation and fosters the primacy of legislative intent. In addition, we observe 
that this natural experiment remains ripe for further empirical analysis, potentially 
yielding more granular observations.321  
At core, the comparison of Lanham Act and Patent Act fee-shifting cases provides 
real evidence that percolation does in fact have an impact on doctrine. Fee-shifting 
doctrine in the patent context from 1946 (when the first fee-shifting statute was 
enacted) to 1982 passed through multiple circuits and yet resulted in unexpectedly 
consistent, albeit not identical, standards across the circuits.322 Pre-1982 patent fee 
shifting, while not monolithic in its articulation, was sufficiently uniform, given the 
explicit grant of discretion to the trial court, and simply reflected the normal variation 
of percolating language. The regional circuits settled upon a broad, flexible doctrine 
that promoted trial court discretion and so supported legislative intent as reflected in 
statutory language.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 321. Octane Fitness and Highmark led to an immediate increase in the number of attorney 
fee requests being made and the percentage of such requests being granted under the Patent 
Act. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE WE AT AN INFLECTION 
POINT 7 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc 
-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNB6-KCNN] (finding that in the 16 months 
preceding Octane Fitness, there were 69 fee-shifting requests, 26% of which were granted; in 
the 20 months following, there were 144 requests, 41% of which were granted); see also Scott 
M. Flanz, Octane Fitness: The Shifting of Patent Attorneys’ Fees Moves into High Gear, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 329 (2016); W. Keith Robinson, Essay, Awarding Attorney Fees and 
Deterring Patent Trolls, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 281 (2016). 
  Practitioners have argued that Octane Fitness has not had an appreciable impact on 
the grant or denial of attorney-fee awards under the Lanham Act. One pair of commentators 
argued that district courts are largely awarding fees under Octane Fitness’ second factor (the 
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated) in circumstances that would have 
warranted attorney fees under the previous standard (e.g., “sanctionable conduct, unjustified 
litigating tactics, and fraud”), leading to no real change. Kevin R. Miller & Brian M. Block, 
Collecting Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act: The Shifting Definition of an “Exceptional 
Case,” 12 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 30, 36 (2015). Another trio of practitioners noted that in 
some circuits, there was no real appreciable change in the underlying standard post-Octane 
Fitness, and so no change in outcomes would be expected there. Bryan Wheelock, Kara 
Fussner & Daisy Manning, The Award of Attorneys’ Fees in Exceptional Cases Under 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 TRADEMARK REP. 1011, 1035 (2016). They predicted, 
however, that in those circuits that had previously applied a bad-faith standard, the number of 
fee awards will increase over time as the standard for receiving same is now lower. Id. There 
is now sufficient passage of time to allow empirical analysis of this important topic (although 
we leave that to a future project). 
 322. Rose & Rosenquist, supra note 112, at 71. 
84 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:39 
 
 
It was only with the introduction of the Federal Circuit in 1982 as the sole voice 
in intermediate patent appeals that we witness a significant and consequential change 
in patent fee-shifting doctrine. The upside of this court specialization was more 
uniform doctrine, including in the fee-shifting arena; the downside was that the lack 
of percolation led to rigid fee-shifting rules that impermissibly curtailed trial court 
discretion in defiance of legislative mandate. Ultimately, the Supreme Court 
determined that this path was so divorced from the statute that the Federal Circuit 
doctrine was struck down in 2014 in Octane Fitness and Highmark. 
In contrast, Lanham Act fee-shifting law percolated through multiple coequal 
circuits and it continues to do so to this day. It did not consolidate around a single, 
early articulation of a standard, but rather split into a “rainbow of standards,” 323 as 
described by Judge Posner in Nightingale.324 However, Judge Posner overstated the 
impact of this diversity of language as it is not at all clear that these divergent 
standards led to significantly disparate outcomes. In the end, percolation provided 
just the sort of variety one would expect, yielding a landscape from which the 
Supreme Court could choose the best to consolidate if desired. We see that 
percolation clearly has a substantial impact on doctrinal development.  
As to the nature of doctrine subject to percolation versus specialization, we 
observe important differences. In this case, percolated fee-shifting doctrine adhered 
more closely to the statutory mandate for breadth, flexibility, and due deference to 
the trial court. When the Supreme Court held that an “exceptional” case was to be 
assessed with reference to the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, the trademark 
standards did not require substantial revision. The broad definition of exceptional 
already fit within the various frameworks. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit 
standard had substantially narrowed the definition of exceptional, at least in the case 
of plaintiff misconduct. That appellate court crafted a rule so idiosyncratic that the 
Supreme Court was required to essentially erase it and mandate the return to the basic 
dictionary definition as a starting point.325 In essence, percolated decisions were like 
blades of grass, requiring only a little trimming, while the Federal Circuit’s isolation 
grew a tall weed that required eradication. 
These results are in line with the more general benefits of percolation that we 
hypothesized would be present in the case law. Among the most important is the 
potential for percolation to limit judicial hyperactivity. Our analysis suggests that the 
Federal Circuit engaged in hyperactive decision-making in the context of fee shifting 
by establishing a narrow test that reduced the need for fact finding or the 
consideration of equity. In contrast, the percolating courts were less inclined toward 
hyperactive appropriation of the trial court’s role in determining exceptionality. Even 
more clearly, hyperactive decision-making led to an erroneous heightened burden of 
proof and inadequately deferential review in the Patent Act context. The percolating 
doctrine of the Lanham Act avoided both of these missteps.  
In addition, our prediction that percolation would limit judicial activism bore fruit 
in the analysis as well. One can argue that the Federal Circuit’s narrow path for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 323. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 (D. Mass. 
2001). 
 324. Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
 325. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553–54 (2014). 
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compensation against plaintiffs reflected an activist policy view that patent owners 
should have their day in court.326 That policy view led the court to create a rule that 
cemented the rights of patent owners and ensured that district courts would find only 
the most egregious conduct to be “exceptional.” Conversely, modern Lanham Act 
doctrine on fee shifting does not appear to be directed to a policy with any particular 
bent for or against plaintiffs. This is not surprising. It is doubtful that regional circuits 
view themselves as trademark experts at a level higher than any other area of law, 
reducing the motivation to craft policy.327 In addition, if one circuit did step in a 
significantly different direction than the others to engage in policymaking, it would 
immediately stand out as a circuit split that would attract the attention of the Supreme 
Court for possible correction. The threat of reversal is perhaps more powerful than 
the gratification a court receives from making a substantive statement on the law. 
In the end, in view of the advantages in limiting hyperactivity and activism as 
well as the potential (moderate) increase in accuracy, it seems clear that percolation 
is the better approach in the context of fee shifting. But is this always the case? Does 
this experiment suggest the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit should be 
eliminated? In short, no. When the overall role of percolation in the administration 
of a property system is considered, one must conclude that it has both positive and 
negative impacts. And in the context of patents, the positives of uniformity outweigh 
advantages from a large number of percolating courts in many cases.  
Patent law plays an incentive role in innovation, and that incentive depends on 
some degree of certainty in the law.328 Variation in essential legal tests such as 
patentability could be highly detrimental to nationwide commercialization. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has neither the resources nor the inclination to address 
the circuit splits in complex patent doctrine that would inevitably arise in the absence 
of a specialized appellate court. This, of course, is the very reason the Federal Circuit 
was created in the first place.329 Although it would be useful to have percolation in 
contexts like fee shifting—when trial court discretion is most important and certainty 
in the law is minimized in favor of the need for flexible, ex post remedies—the cost 
is too high.  
Despite the judgment that the current Federal Circuit court structure is likely 
better overall than a nonspecialized alternative, the results of the percolation 
experiment are very relevant. They demonstrate in very clear terms the Federal 
Circuit’s tendency to drift away from the statute. The court should appreciate this 
fact, and work to keep itself in check when crafting doctrine. The Federal Circuit can 
play an important role in reducing the negative effects of its own isolation, and we 
hope that this empirical analysis will motivate additional attention to this issue. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 326. See, e.g., Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. Brainlab Medizinische Computersysteme 
Gmbh, 603 F.3d 943, 953–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We have held that there is a presumption that 
an assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith.”). 
 327. As compared to specialist courts, generalist courts enjoy greater benefits of cross-
pollination, which reduces their activist tendencies. See Oswald, supra note 5, at 260–62.  
 328. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Patently Uncertain, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
(forthcoming 2019) (describing the nature of uncertainty in patent law and pointing out that it 
can be either harmful, a source of strategic advantage, or even beneficial to all participants).  
 329. See supra Part I.A. 
86 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:39 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
There are advantages and disadvantages to specialized courts. This is not a 
surprise, as one would assume that any system as complex as the judiciary cannot ex 
ante be molded to perfection. The existence of such trade-offs has long been 
acknowledged in the most prominent American example of a specialized court—the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However, much of this discussion has 
been conducted at a theoretical level.  
One such discussion is about the trade-off of having a single answer—
uniformity—versus improving the chances of developing the right answer through 
percolation of an issue in several independent appellate courts. This Article analyzed 
a serendipitous natural experiment to consider how percolating and isolated courts 
develop doctrine. The fact that identical statutory language has moved through two 
different appellate settings provides a powerful lens that is ripe for exploration.  
The results of our natural experiment are in line with theory, but striking 
nonetheless. Our analysis provides strong evidence that percolating courts are more 
likely to adhere to the core statutory mandates and refrain from attempting to engage 
in pseudo-legislation. In other words, as we predicted, percolation reduces the drift 
toward hyperactivity and activism that many have identified in the Federal Circuit.  
This does not prove that generalist circuit courts are superior or that specialized 
courts should not be used; that is neither an argument we would make nor one that 
we think is supported by the larger policy goals of U.S. patent law. But this evidence 
does highlight the trade-offs inherent in court structure choices and is an important 
first step to empirically uncovering similar specialization-related deficiencies that 
could be corrected, thereby enhancing the operation of the intellectual property 
system. 
 
